Mere longevity seems insufficient in itself to guarantee a Carolingian ruler much modern historiographical notice. If Louis the German seems unfairly neglected by historians, can it be surprising that his elder brother Pippin I of Aquitaine has attracted even less attention? Admittedly, he has had the benefit of a fine edition of his charters, something his father still awaits, but in most other respects he has been unlucky, even with his natural defenders. The substantial but unfinished study of Carolingian Aquitaine by Léonce Auzias is at its briefest and least complete in the treatment of this reign. Moreover, the book itself is now half a century old. By such standards alone the rule of Pippin I in Aquitaine deserves a fresh examination, and it should not be forgotten that the king himself has an importance for events beyond the frontiers of the realm entrusted to him.

The assessment of Pippin's significance on the wider stage of Carolingian politics in the reign of Louis the Pious depends to some extent on the view to be taken of the role of the individual participant, particularly in the central events of the years 829 to 834. An interpretation of this period that emphasizes conflicts of ideology is bound to minimize the parts played by the individual actors in the interests of emphasizing unity of motivation. Thus too great a concentration upon Louis the Pious's attempts to create a regnum for the infant Charles can give a specious inevitability to the events of the 830s, and in particular make the actions of the elder sons seem mechanical and unsubtle. Even when historians have adopted an approach that is more oriented towards the differences of individual contributions, it is not surprising that attention should have been concentrated on those, such as Agobard, whose writings provide the key to their motives and actions, or on those, such as Wala or Louis the Pious himself, about whom others wrote. Yet to generalize from such particular instances can create a distorted perspective. What, to take but one example, can be said about Helisachar, but on the other hand who could deny that he was one of the central figures of the court in the first half of the reign, as chancellor, missus, liturgical reformer, and acknowledged heir of Benedict of Aniane? How can his defection from the master he had served for

1 Recueil des actes de Pépin 1er et de Pépin II, rois d'Aquitaine (814-48), ed. L. Levillain (Paris, 1926).
so long, both at Aachen and in Aquitaine, be understood? The simple answer is that in personal terms it cannot be, in that the evidence which would enable us to approach such a question in such terms does not exist, and instead there is a temptation to fall back upon broader, more general patterns of interpretation, that might make of him an outraged enthusiast for imperial unity, whose sense of ideological betrayal outweighed his personal loyalty to his lord. Not everyone, fortunately, will be convinced by so theoretical a line of argument or find such abstract notions in themselves the sole and sufficient justification for the inner conflicts that may be taken to have been the hidden counterparts to the overt political and military confrontations and shifts of allegiance that mark the central years of the reign of Louis the Pious. However, most historians would admit to the existence of such difficulties in the cases of Helisachar and his like, intellectuals who, unlike Agobard, have omitted to let us know what they were thinking. But are the motives of kings necessarily less complex? They too need to be seen in as precise a context as the evidence will allow if a sympathetic understanding is to be obtained of why they took the actions they did.

Much of Pippin I's career as king of Aquitaine, from 817 until his death in 838, is quite uncontroversial, and the evidence, such as it is, reveals him going about his business and his pleasures too in time-honoured ways. As has been recognized from the recorded places of issue of his surviving charters, Pippin displayed a marked penchant for his rural rather than urban palaces. To link this to a taste for country pursuits is hardly unreasonable, particularly as the king's enthusiasm for hunting gave rise to scarcely veiled criticism in Ermoldus's second poem addressed to Pippin. Such an indulgence, however, is not necessarily to be taken as a sign of regal levity or lack of attention to more serious business; as Professor Jarnut has recently and convincingly emphasized, the vital political role of such hunting parties in the forming and maintaining of group identity amongst the king's immediate entourage and those he wished to attract into it cannot be minimized. The hunt was more than a means of relaxation.

The apparatus of government also looks to have functioned effectively in Aquitaine at this time. In the light of the generally lamentable state of the evidence relating to the different areas of that kingdom in the ninth century, a surprisingly large number of Pippin I's charters have survived or are known of, and their editor, Levillain, was able to carry out an exhaustive study of the personnel and functioning of the royal chancery. Furthermore, a recent survey of the evidence relating to the alienation of the lands of the royal fisc in Aquitaine clearly indicates that there was no acceleration of such a process under Pippin I, any more than under his father, though it must be added that the value of such an enquiry is somewhat reduced when it is admitted that virtually no evidence exists to show what property the fisc was acquiring in the period under consideration. It is at least certain that it was making such acquisitions, and thus it is theoretically possible that alienations were being more than compensated for. Unfortunately, this also means that the role of royal patronage as a political tool cannot be properly evaluated either.

Another area in which problems of evidence abound, but in which Pippin may have played a more distinguished part than is generally assumed, is that of the patronage of learning. Even discounting the late and problematic tradition coming from the Church of Metz that Pippin himself had received both lay and clerical educational training in the episcopal school of Metz, there are no grounds for doubting that the future king benefited from some kind of schooling in his early years whilst his father was ruling Aquitaine, but no details of it survive. That this took place within the confines of the kingdom can be no more than a reasonable assumption, but this was a region with a distinguished past in terms of learning. Appreciation of the intellectual life of Carolingian Aquitaine in the pre-Viking period has suffered particularly from the disproportionate loss of manuscripts from the region. The few indications that are available suggest that it was thriving, and that a number of cathedrals and monasteries both had substantial libraries and were in contact with centres of learning not only elsewhere in the Frankish world but also in Ireland, Wessex, and northern Spain.

What then may be said in these respects of the royal court of Pippin I's day? The fate of the works of the poet most closely associated with the king indicates something of the problem of the survival of evidence. Although all of his extant poems were written during his exile in Strasburg in the mid–820s, there is no reason to doubt from the internal evidence of his verses that Ermoldus Nigellus was closely associated with the court of Pippin prior to his fall from favour, the causes of which are unknown. Furthermore, the identification of the poet, recalled from exile, with the Aquitanian chancellor...
of 838, an association very tentatively suggested by Levillain, is by no means improbable. For one thing, relative nonentities are unlikely to be sent into exile under the personal supervision of an important bishop. Whether or not a second period at court in the 830s can be accepted, it is improbable that Ermoldus only found his voice in banishment, but apart from the three poems of that period no other works of his have survived or are even known of. The works that are available escaped a fate only by the slimmest of margins: the Carmen in honorem Hlacodei augusti being transmitted in two manuscripts and the two poems addressed to Pippin I in only one of them. Neither of the two manuscripts in question can be associated with Aquitaine. The older of the two, a tenth-century codex that preserves the better text of the poem on Louis, comes from the Rhône valley, whilst the sole testimony to the Pippin verses, a fifteenth-century manuscript now in the British Library, probably derives its contents from a collection of texts put together in northern Italy in the late tenth century, quite possibly in an Ottonian court circle.

The themes, and the strengths and weaknesses, of Ermoldus's poetic art have been well studied in recent work. All that needs to be stressed here is that in the court of Pippin I, just as in those of Louis the Pious and above all Charlemagne, such poetic addresses from absent, or even exiled, members were clearly neither unexpected nor out of place. Indeed, despite the apparent sensitivity of his position, Ermoldus felt able to mix praise with some criticism of the recipient of his work, particularly in the second poem to Pippin with its warnings concerning the king's too great fondness for hunting. In a work such as this the poet was exercising some of the liberty of the late Roman panegyricist, who, within the highly formalized framework of an extended expression of praise, could also use his verses as a vehicle for transmitting advice, requests, or on occasion criticism to his ruler. The two poems addressed by Ermoldus to Pippin, brief as they are in comparison to that dedication to him of the De instilutione regia, were clearly neither unexpected nor out of place. For one thing, as previously suggested, the date of writing is by no means clear, and furthermore, as in the case of Ermoldus's addresses, it is reasonable to presuppose a large measure of acceptability to the recipient in the content of such a work. Most of Jonas's themes, his emphasis on the royal office as ministerium and on the king's obligation to ensure that his servants, and above all his judges, acted justly, belong firmly in the mainstream of Carolingian thinking about government in the first half of the ninth century. There is little reason to doubt that Pippin any less than his father was open to the persuasion of such ways of envisaging the nature of his office. This Church-inspired sense of royal duty manifested itself most directly in his case in his role as monastic patron.

Around the middle of the tenth century the monastery of Saint-Maixent in the county of Poitiers was restored by Bishop Ebulus of Limoges, brother of the then duke of Aquitaine and himself count of Poitiers. The monastery had previously been ravaged by Vikings and abandoned. In his charter of
refoundation Bishop Ebolus referred back to the monastery's creation, which he ascribed to 'Pippinus rex Aquitaniae, edificator monasteriorum, cognomento pius, filius Ludovici pii imperatoris'. In this the bishop was not being historically exact. The true origins of Saint-Maixent are obscure, but they date to Merovingian rather than Carolingian times. Ebolus was also the second rather than the first refoundation of the house, and his predecessor was Louis the Pious rather than Pippin, as evidenced by a charter of immunity given by the emperor to an Abbot Tetbert in 815. If, as is generally accepted, Pippin did not receive his royal title before 817, it was not from a now lost Aquitanian precursor of the imperial diploma that Ebolus took his view of Pippin I as the founder of Saint-Maixent, but yet he is categorical on the matter. The explanation probably lies in the events of a slightly later period. Between 833 and 846 the monastery was under the rule of a certain Abbo. At first, like his predecessors, he exercised his authority as lay abbot, but at some point between 833 and 838 he himself became a monk, on the orders of King Pippin. In other words the monastery was reformed, and by royal command.

As the well-known migrations of the community of St Philibert illustrate, Aquitaine suffered perhaps more than any other region of the Frankish Empire from the ministrations of the Vikings, to the extent that not only have few traces of its intellectual culture, in the form of manuscripts, survived to the present, but the kingdom is also seriously under-represented, for the quantity and importance of its monastic centres, in the number of its charters, extant or recorded. Even so, when the scant remains are surveyed, the presence of Pippin I makes itself felt. Grants of various kinds were made by him to Saint-Martial, Limoges, to Manlieu (Clermont), to Saint-Croix and Saint-Hilaire in Poitiers, to Saint-Maixent, which received at least two charters in the 820s as well as reform in the 830s, to Fossés, to Saint-Antonin in the Rouergue, to Conques, to Solignac, to Montolieu (Carcassonne), and to Saint-Julien, Broude, amongst others. To these should be added the possibility of less formally recorded grants. In some instances, as with the gifts of property to Saint-Maixent in 825 and to Montolieu in 835, at the request of third parties, in both of these cases local counts, in as well as with others of these charters, which clearly represent acts of royal generosity, the king's own hand can be seen in acts of foundation and restoration. Literary references and later charters attribute the creation and endowment of Saint-Jean d'Angély (Charente Maritime), Saint-Cyprian in vigilio Pictavensis, and Brantome in the county of Périgord to Pippin I. He was also responsible for the restoration of the cathedral church of Saint-Maurice in Angers in 837, and in at least two instances monasteries were subordinated by him to another in order to increase the endowment and improve the viability of a favoured foundation. In addition, the reform of monastic life imposed upon Saint-Maixent in the 830s is not the only venture of its kind attributed to Pippin. He is also credited with having done something similar to Saint-Cybard in Angoulême. It was ultimately fitting then that Pippin’s chosen place of burial should have been the convent of St Radegund, Saint-Croix de Poitiers, in whose interests and for whose protection the sole surviving capitulary of his reign was issued.

Equally suggestive is the evidence relating to monastic life in Wasconia ulterior, the Basque regions to the south of the Pyrenees, which broke free of a brief Frankish domination as the result of the second battle of Roncesvales in 824, and developed into the kingdom of Pamplona. The Constitutione de servitio monasteriorum of 817 records no monasteries in this region at all, although under Frankish control and despite the existence of several in Wasconia anterior, the future Gascony. Nor is there any earlier evidence for any form of monastic life between the Rioja and the Pyrenees. Yet by 848, when the Cordoban cleric Eulogius visited Pamplona, there were at least four major monasteries in the tiny kingdom. Moreover, he found in their possession a corpus of poetic and patristic texts then unavailable to the Christian community in the south. At least one of the manuscripts in question has been
linked to the monastery of Saint-Martial, Limoges, and the presupposition must be that the texts and in all probability the monastic environment that entertained them were implantations from Aquitaine. In view of the political circumstances already referred to, the most likely period for such a monastic colonization to have taken place is between the years 817 and 824, and most likely after 819, when, as the Royal Frankish Annals record, Pippin I took an army into Gascony and imposed his authority on it.41

In assessing these acts of patronage in Aquitaine and beyond it is important to remember not only the restricted nature of the surviving evidence, but also the limited subsequent attractiveness of the historical memory of Pippin I. Dying before his father and with his own royal line expiring in the person of his determined but unfortunate son Pippin II, his name was hardly one to conjure with for subsequent generations. Even houses that can be shown to have owed much to Pippin I in his own day subsequently forgot him or confused him with his distinguished great-grandfather of the same name. This was his fate, for example, in the historiographical tradition of Saint-Maixent, whose Chronicle conflates the two Pippins, and attributes the patronage of the king of Aquitaine to his predecessor.42 Likewise at Sainte-Foi de Conques, the only site in which the former's munificence is still tangible, the purse reliquary now held to be the gift of Pippin of Aquitaine was previously thought to have come from the hand of Pippin the Short.43 Both this magnificent testimony to the Carolingian goldsmith's art and, more impressively still, the crown which now held to be the gift of Pippin of Aquitaine was previously thought to have come from the hand of Pippin the Short.43 Both this magnificent testimony to the Carolingian goldsmith's art and, more impressively still, the crown which now held to be the gift of Pippin of Aquitaine was previously thought to have come from the hand of Pippin the Short.43 Both this magnificent testimony to the Carolingian goldsmith's art and, more impressively still, the crown which now held to be the gift of Pippin of Aquitaine was previously thought to have come from the hand of Pippin the Short.43 Both this magnificent testimony to the Carolingian goldsmith's art and, more impressively still, the crown which now held to be the gift of Pippin of Aquitaine was previously thought to have come from the hand of Pippin the Short.43

Equally consistent with an acceptance on Pippin's part of the kind of views on the nature and obligations of the royal office contained in Jonas's De institutione regia is the king's reaction to the censures of the bishops at the instigation of the bishops at the synod held at Aachen in 837. According to the anonymous Vita Hludovici, complaints were made to the effect that Pippin and his supporters were threatening ecclesiastical property rights.45 The terminology employed makes it clear that what the bishops were getting at were precarial grants, which forced ecclesiastical landowners to lease out property in return for set rents.46 In itself this was not a very iniquitous practice, except in an age of rising land values, especially if monasteries were themselves unable to exploit their resources to the full. However, this became a target for sustained clerical opposition in the ninth century, perhaps because such fixed rents were becoming economically disadvantageous to ecclesiastical landlords. On the other hand the making of such precarial grants to lay supporters had been a common procedure and a valuable political tool for Carolingian rulers since the time of Charles Martel. The latter in particular became the reformers' posthumous scapegoat, and his historical reputation was made to suffer in consequence.47 Both Charlemagne and Louis the Pious were more circumspect in this matter than their forebears; perhaps they could afford to be. However, they did not renounce the practice while allowing restrictions on it. Pippin, when faced by the synod's complaints in 837, appears to have reacted by revoking some if not all of the controversial grants. This is certainly what the author of the Vita Hludovici thought, and his impression may be confirmed by at least one of Pippin's charters.48 This was a restoration of rights made in favour of the church of Saint-Maurice, Angers, on 25 December 837, just three months after the synod, which amongst other things involved restoring the cathedral church's control over the lands of the monastic cell of Cha-lonnes-sur-Loire, previously held by the laymen Leotduinus and Gozbert at royal pleasure. Some of the charters of 838 may have similar significance.49

The episode of the 837 synod of Aachen and its specific condemnation of Pippin and his precarial grants is a strange one. The evidence just considered seems to suggest that in most respects the king of Aquitaine was a major benefactor as far as the Church was concerned. Although his generosity was largely confined to Aquitaine, where his own resources were primarily concentrated, it was not exclusively so, and a number of monasteries outside the limits of his kingdom, such as Jumièges and St Martin in Tours, benefited from his actions.50 Jonas's dedication of the De institutione regia is also indicative of a probable willingness on Pippin's part to take clerical advice seriously. In general Pippin's concerns in the ecclesiastical sphere would seem to align him closely with his father, many of whose interests he appears to have shared, and on whose behalf some of his acts of patronage were specifically...
carried out. Why then did he encounter episcopal censure in 837? On the other hand, why was he so ready to remedy the supposed abuses that the bishops denounced?

As has already been mentioned, the making of precarial grants to lay supporters was a valuable political tool for a Carolingian ruler, at least until such time as mounting clerical opposition to the practice made it almost counter-productive. In the increasingly defensive stance that the Franks found themselves obliged to take in respect of their frontiers from the second half of the reign of Charlemagne onwards, lands were not being acquired by conquest, and as in the time of Charles Martel royal use of the resources of the Church became the principal alternative to the alienation of the lands of the fisc in the ruler’s exercise of political patronage.13 In this way the deliberations of the synod of Aachen in 837 could take on distinctly secular overtones, in that the ensuing condemnation of his making of precarial grants clearly limited Pippin’s ability to maintain his own supporters. It is also surprising to find that Pippin alone was singled out for mention in this context. There seem few grounds for doubting that his two brothers were doing exactly the same thing. Equally significant may be the clear implication given by the author of the Vita Hludovici that their father the emperor approved of, if indeed he had not instigated, the conciliar censure, and applied his own secular authority to the requirement on Pippin to act on the synod’s complaint.14 The roots of this poorly reported episode may lie in the events of the earlier years of the decade and in the period of conflict between Louis and his elder sons.

Before turning to consider the role played by Pippin in that crucial period of the reigns of both father and son it is advisable to look briefly at one other aspect of the latter’s rule in Aquitaine, and that is the political geography of the kingdom with which he had been entrusted. Little by way of apologia is needed nowadays for the study of early medieval Aquitaine. It is no longer seen as being of peripheral interest or of limited importance, either in its own right or as part of the wider contexts of the Merovingian and Carolingian periods.15 Indeed, since the appearance of Michel Rouche’s major study of the history of the region in the period from 418 to 751 it may rightly be thought to have fared better than any of the other components of the early medieval Frankish kingdoms.16 The incomplete nature as well perhaps as the age of Auzias’ treatment of Carolingian Aquitaine prevents this historiographical triumph from being complete, though this need not be irremediable.17 Attention, however, still needs to be focused on some of the frontier and other areas recently attached to it.

13 See ch. 14 in this vol. by Timothys Reuter, Wallace-Hadrill, The Frankish Church, pp. 132-42.
14 Vita Hludovici, ch. 56, p. 192.
15 Martindale, The Kingdom of Aquitaine”, p. 137 n. 27.
17 See Martindale, The Kingdom of Aquitaine”, for new work on the region.

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One of the obscurest, though most important, of these is unquestionably Gascony, or Wasconia exterior. Developments in this region, basically comprising the area between the Garonne and the northern slopes of the Pyrenees, are poorly documented for the reign of Pippin I.18 Frankish control over the Basque valleys of the Arga and the Aragon to the south of the mountains had only been established in 806, and it must be assumed that this territory was also entrusted to Pippin in 817. However, as previously mentioned, Frankish authority there proved short-lived, being terminated in 824 when the imperial army under Counts Aelius and Aznar was ambushed in the pass of Roncesvalles.19 The Basque area north of the mountains remained under Frankish domination, as it had been since the early seventh century, but the problems it posed for royal government proved to be equally long-lasting.20 Louis the Pious and Pippin had been faced by revolts there in 816 and 819; in both cases the trouble seems to have been caused by the removal of the local duke or count on suspicion of disaffection or treason.21 Imperial intervention led to the outbreak of open rebellion, which on both occasions had to be forcibly suppressed. Although little is known of the years immediately following, the same pattern of Basque support for a local ruler in opposition to his nominal overlord continued to manifest itself throughout the period of Pippin I’s rule. For the year 836 the Annals of Bertin record that ‘Aznar, who had revolted from Pippin many years before, died a horrible death’.22 It is not suggested that the succession of his brother Sancho in any way altered these conditions. Thus, although the details remain as opaque to us as the actual nature of Aznar’s ‘horrible death’, Gascony seems to have remained a source of difficulty throughout the reign.

On the other hand, loyalty to the regime does not seem to have been a problem to be faced in the other Pyrenean regions usually or occasionally attached to the Aquitanian kingdom. In particular the March based upon Toulose not only exhibited no signs of disaffection during the reign of Pippin I, it proved to be one of the few strongholds of support for his son Pippin II, until forcibly annexed by Charles the Bald in 844. Further south, the Spanish March proper, with its centre at Barcelona, was not normally attached to Aquitaine, but in times of crisis Pippin’s armies seem to have been expected by the emperor to provide the first line of support for its defenders if menaced by a serious threat from Arab and Berber forces in the Ebro valley, as occurred in

18 Collins, The Basques, pp. 127-31, for the most recent treatment and bibliography.
19 Annales regni Francorum, s.a. 824, ed. Kurze, p. 166.
the period 826 to 829. The county of Carcassonne on the other hand did form an integral part of the kingdom of Aquitaine at this time, and its count Oliba was a periodic attender at Pippin’s court. The survival of a number of the charters that relate to this county indicates something of royal concern for it, not only in aspects of monastic patronage but also in the promotion of its resettling, generally per aquisitionem, by bodies of Hispani moving from the frontier areas further south. In general these regions seem to have remained little affected by the period of confrontation and civil war between Louis the Pious and his sons in the years 829 to 834, though paradoxically it was to be a sequence of events on the Spanish March that triggered off that conflict.

Whilst the extension of the authority of the king of Aquitaine along most if not all of the northern slopes of the Pyrenees is easy enough to understand, it may not seem so clear why three Burgundian counties, those of Autun, Avallon, and Nevers, were attached to his realm in 817. The reasons for this were probably geographical, historical, and political. Two of these counties are separated from the classic Burgundian heartland of the Saône valley and the upper Rhône by the Monts du Morvan and the plateau of Langres, and their two centres at Avallon and Nevers are situated on rivers flowing northwards and westwards into Aquitaine and Neustria. Autun is closer than either of the other two to the Saône valley, but even in its case the natural lines of communication run primarily to the north and to the west. Moreover, from Merovingian times onwards the city of Autun enjoyed a peculiarly close relationship with Poitiers. In part this derived from the burial in Poitiers of St Leudegar, bishop of Autun and victim of a struggle for power with the Neustrian mayor of the palace Ebroin. After his execution in 676 his surviving supporters took refuge south of the Loire, and he himself was interred at Poitiers, with which city his family was much associated. His burial in Sainte-Croix, later to contain Pippin I’s tomb, and the involvement in his cause of Bishop Ansoald of Poitiers, formerly abbot of Saint-Maixent, ensured a continuing interest in his cult in the Aquitanian city. The third

version of the Passio sancti Leudcgari was probably composed by a monk of Saint-Maixent in the reign of Pippin I or in that of his father.

The evidence relating to Leudegar, his family, and supporters makes it clear that close ties existed between various aristocratic families in Poitou and around Autun and northern Burgundy in the mid-seventh century. An identical phenomenon can be detected in the ninth also. Some powerful families had considerable interests in both areas. One of these was probably that of William of Toulouse, the founder of Gellone. One of the centres of his dynasty’s power and, no doubt, landed wealth was located in the north of Burgundy. Four generations of his line held office as counts of Autun, and it was in Chalon-sur-Saône that some of its members unsuccessfully sought refuge from the vengeance of the Emperor Lothar in 834. Amongst those then killed there was Gerberga, sister of Bernard of Septimania, who was drowned in a barrel in the Saône as a witch. She is called sanctimonialis in the Annals of St Bertin, but it is unlikely that a member of this influential family should have been no more than an ordinary nun, and although the identification cannot be proved, the fact that the abbess of Sainte-Croix in Poitiers in the early 830s went by the name of Gerberga is at least suggestive. Likewise, in 825 Pippin I gave the estate of Tizay to Saint-Maixent at the request of a Count Bernard. That he was the count of Poitiers is a working hypothesis, but Auzias saw in this charter of donation the first recorded appearance of Bernard of Septimania. Levideil, however, in his work on the family of the Nibelungen preferred the claims of another Bernard, the son of Childerich II and the cousin of Pippin I’s wife Ingeltrude. Some additional weight may be given to this identification by the possibility that the latter’s father may well be the lay abbot Teutbert of Louis the Pious’s grant of immunity to Saint-Maixent in 815–16.

Like the family of William of Toulouse, that of Pippin’s queen Ingeltrude, a branch of the great aristocratic dynasty of the Nibelungen, extended its interests widely across these contiguous regions of northern Aquitaine and Burgundy. A number of her cousins can be shown to have held lands and offices in Burgundy, on occasion as counts of Autun. To some extent, in the matter of the Bernards, it may be thought not to matter too much which one

44 J. M. Salrach, El procés de formació nacional de Catalunya (segle VIII-IX), 2 vols., 2nd edn. (Barcelona, 1981), 1: 27–112; Salrach, however, with his division of the participants into ‘unitarists’, ‘legitimists’, and ‘regionalists’, has imported interpretative models of uncertain value into the study of the history of the Spanish March in this period.
45 Levillain, Récit de guerres, doc. xxxii, cf. also xxxiv.
49 Passio Leudcgari episcopi Augustudennensis, versus 1. prolatus, ed. B. Kraus (MGH SRM 5), repr. with new intro. (CC 117), p. 529, for Leudegar’s uncle Didus, Bishop of Poitiers, and his own early years spent in the city.
50 Levillain, ‘Les Nibelungen historiqucs et leurs alliances de famille’, pt. i. 51 Ibid., pp. 358–88, for the counts of Autun in the 9th cent.; for some of the Nibelungen’s landed interests see Chartes de l’abbaye de Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire, ed. M. Prou and A. Vidier (Paris and Orleans, 1900), docs. x. xi. xii. xiii. xiv. xv. (i. 24–30. 36–8), also docs. xx. xxi. xxv (i. 47. 51. 69).
was being referred to in the charter of 825, for in Levillain’s view at least they were but two members of one enormous family. This claim is based upon similarities in family-naming patterns to be discerned in the descendants of William of Toulouse and those of Nibelung I, who, for Levillain, were brothers, but this can neither be substantiated nor disproved by any contemporary evidence. However, whatever may be thought about that argument, it is clear that whether or not these two great families were but branches of a single dynasty, it did not make them natural allies, and their rivalry and conflict in areas such as the county of Autun, in which both had interests, helps to make sense of some of the involvements of Pippin I, married by his father’s command in 822 to a Nibelung, in the wider political turmoil of the Frankish empire in the late 820s and the 830s. Although prosopographical evidence relating to these years is distinctly intermittent in terms of its survival, it is surprising to note that the line of William of Toulouse seems to make no mark for itself whatever between the latter’s resignation of his charge over the March of Toulouse in 804 and the rise to prominence of his sons, Gozhelm and Bernard, in Septimania in the 820s. As Bernard survived to die at the hands of Charles the Bald in 844 and one of his own sons was still active in the late 870s, it looks reasonable to suspect that he was still a minor or little older when his father retired to Gellone. Certainly the latter’s piety does not seem to have benefited his heirs in practical and political terms. Whether they be distant cousins or not it looks as if Bernard and his brothers faced considerable difficulties in re-establishing the local pre-eminence of his family in areas such as the Spanish March and the county of Autun against the ascendancy of other aristocratic families and factions, amongst whom the Nibelungen were one of the most significant. For such an excluded lineage the road to restoration lay through influence at court. For most of the first half of his reign Louis the Pious’ government was largely in the hands of a caucus of advisers, whose composition only changed significantly once, after the death of Benedict of Aniane in 821. Amongst its most influential members could be numbered the abbots Hilsachar and Hilduin, together with Adalhard and Wala after 821, and from the ranks of the laity the counts Hugh and Matfrid, the former of whom was father-in-law to Louis’s son Lothar. Throughout most of the 820s this group displayed remarkable unanimity. Its network of associations extended deeply into the ranks of the established aristocracy, not least through the marriages that the emperor arranged for his sons with members of leading noble families. However, the rise of the Empress Judith and the aspirations towards power at court on the part of her family brought about a rapid undermining of the status quo, a realignment of influence, and ultimately a conflict in which virtually all of the emperor’s former advisers threw themselves behind the opposition to their master. In such circumstances men like Bernard were able to secure local and indeed central power which they had been excluded from under the previous dispensation. Moreover, it was only the existence of such ambitious but deprived individuals and families that could provide a new court faction with the more broadly based support it needed to survive. Thus it is not surprising to find that Odo, who replaced Matfrid at Orleans in 828, was a close relative of Bernard. It is in this context that the role of Pippin I, not only in the opposition to his father but in the various shifts in alliance that occurred throughout the period 829 to 834, can best be understood. One thing that is surely clear is that at least until 832–3 his reactions had little to do with Louis the Pious’ attempt to carve out a future realm for Pippin’s young half-brother Charles. This may have served as a motive in terms of Lothar’s actions or even those of Louis the German, but makes no sense in respect of Pippin, whose own allocation was in no way affected by the proposed redistribution of territories of 829. Neither family solidarity nor an Agobardan sense of outrage at the undermining of the ideal of imperial unity seem more credible explanations. As Bishop Thegan’s Vita Hludovici makes clear, neither Pippin nor his younger brother Louis had any enthusiasm for the Ordinatio of 817, which gave the lion’s share of territory to Lothar and proposed a galling future subjection to his authority on the part of his royal brothers. The resulting resentment served as a counterweight to the two kings’ occasional and limited support for Lothar in 830 and 833, and ultimately proved fatal to his ambitions. Indeed, Pippin’s sympathies might have been expected to have lain more fully with his father, both out of self-interest and also because of their fundamental similarities in policies and outlook, as previously suggested. However, in these respects Pippin also shared something of the ideals of Hilsachar, Wala, Fridugis, and others who were alienated from Louis the Pious at the same time that he was. But, except for the revision of the Ordinatio of 817, the importance which can be exaggerated, especially if the views of Agobard are taken as too representative, changes in policies do not seem to have given rise to that sense of the betrayal by the emperor of once shared ideals. Where there had been significant changes by 829 was in the area of personnel. The growing ascendency of the Empress Judith and her family obviously caused concern in the later 820s, but the appointment of Bernard of Septimania to palatine office in 829 proved explosive. The causes of the resentment occasioned by his being named camerarius are not easy to gauge. It

74 For the career of Gozhelm on the March see Saltrac, El procés de formation, l. 42-9, 93-9.
75 L. Halphen, Charlemagne et l’Empire carolingien (Paris, 1947), repr. 1968), 211-27; see now also ch. 2 in this vol. by Josef Semmler.

Pippin I and the Kingdom of Aquitaine

76 See below, p. 381. 1.
77 Auzias, L’Aquitaine carolingienne, p. 91.
78 Niebuhr, Historie, i. 3, ed. Lauer, pp. 810.
79 Thegan, Vita Hludovici p. imperatoris, ch. 21, ed. G. Pertz (MGH SS 2), 596.
was the man, not his office or even his exercise of it, that caused hostility. His predecessor Tanculf is a colourless figure, known best for his part in constructing an organ at Aachen, but it is possible that he had the backing of Heliaschar and previously that of Benedict of Aniane. Bernard only held his appointment for a single winter, long enough to give rise to slander, but surely not to have antagonized all those who banded against him in the spring of 830 and consistently sought to harm all and any members of his family in the years to follow.

The roots of this vital hostility seem to lie further back, in the events of the years 826 to 828 on the Spanish March south of the Pyrenees. The sequence of occurrences is clear enough. In 826 a certain Aizo escaped from detention in Francia to the March, where he raised a rebellion with its centre at Vich, in the course of which he and his supporters ravaged the counties of Cerdanya and Vallespir. Either the same year or early in 827, when faced with the prospect of an imperial counter-offensive, Aizo appealed for aid to the Umayyad Amir of Córdoba, Abd ar-Rahman II. In 827 Louis the Pious sent Heliaschar together with the counts Childebrand and Donatus to the March to restore order. Their precise role is not clear: according to the Royal Frankish Annals they seem to have acted as missi, whilst the campaigning against Aizo was entrusted to Bernard, then count of Barcelona, but the implication of the Vita Hludovici is that they commanded the army. Both sources suggest that these steps were proving effective, until the approach down the Ebro from Saragossa of a Muslim army despatched from Córdoba changed the scale of the conflict. According to the Royal Frankish Annals: it was when intelligence of this reached Louis the Pious that he ordered Pippin of Aquitaine 'to defend the borders of his kingdom'. However, the Aquitanian army, into which this command was translated, was slow to arrive on the March, allowing the Muslim forces time to ravage the regions of Barcelona and Gerona and to withdraw unscathed. In February 828 at an assembly in Aachen a post-mortem was conducted on the previous year's events, in consequence of which Hugh, count of Tours and father-in-law of the Emperor Lothar, and his ally Count Matfrid of Orléans, the commanders of the army sent by Pippin, were censured and deprived of their offices. The annalist implies that their slowness in arriving on the March in 827 had been deliberate, and therefore intended to leave Bernard to face the Cordoban army unprotected.

Is the outline of this episode as presented to us with general unanimity by


\* Annales regni Francorum, s.a. 826, 827, ed. Kurze, pp. 170, 172; Vita Hludovici, ch. 41, ed. Pertz, p. 630.

\* Ibid.

\* Annales regni Francorum, s.a. 827, p. 173, 'cum inmodicis Francorum copis'.


Both the royal annalist and the author of the Vita Hludovici strictly credible? The normal pattern of Muslim military activity in Spain in the ninth and tenth centuries was for one, or in some years two, armies to set out from Córdoba in the spring, recruiting en route, and arriving in the frontier regions in the north of the peninsula, the Ebro valley or the Spanish March, around July, thus allowing time for about two months of campaigning. The Annals are categoric that the Franks were unaware of the threat until the Cordoban army reached Saragossa, approximately 190 miles from Barcelona. From better-recorded campaigns it is possible to show that such an army operating in the Ebro valley could travel between fifteen and twenty miles a day on average. Thus, having reached Saragossa, they were potentially ten days' march from Barcelona. At the time in question the Emperor Louis was in the north of Francia, either at Compiegne or Niirmegen, expecting trouble from the Danes. When it is allowed that the news of the arrival of the Muslim army at Saragossa had to be sent from the March to the emperor, the latter then had to send an order to Pippin, who in turn had to raise an army and then send it south, it is perhaps less surprising that by the time it arrived the threat had passed. In other words there are good grounds for suspicion that the condemnation of Hugh and Matfrid was politically motivated.

Such an impression is reinforced by the realization that no major losses had been incurred by the failure of the Aquitanian army to arrive on time. Both Barcelona and Gerona had been held against a Muslim assault and Aizo's revolt seems to have collapsed. Some mystery must also surround the whereabouts of Heliaschar, Childebrand, and Donatus, sent to the March earlier in the season. It is also noteworthy that other Frankish failures were rarely followed by such reprisals, particularly against such influential figures. Even if Louis the Pious were acutely sensitive about the defence of Barcelona, whose acquisition was his only personal military achievement, the degrading of his principal lay councillors, whom he himself had entrusted with the command, looks to have been an excessive reaction in the light of what had actually happened. However, if it be allowed that there existed a group at court, as there undoubtedly did, whose interests would be served by the disgrace of the former favourites, a more plausible explanation can be presented. Moreover, in the form of trial or hearing that took place at Aachen the testimony of Bernard, cast in the role of the heroic and betrayed defender of the March, was clearly crucial.

Nor was this the first time that such tactics seem to have been used, particularly in relation to the Spanish March. In 820 the then count of Barcelona, Bera, one of the commanders who had captured the city for Louis
in 801, was forced into what may have been a very unequal trial by battle when accused of treason by a Goth called Senila. Being defeated, Bera was condemned to death but subsequently exiled to Rouen.\textsuperscript{89} His destitution opened the way for the re-establishment on the March of the sons of William of Toulouse, Gozhelm and later Bernard of Septimania.\textsuperscript{90} Not surprisingly, Bera’s son Willemund later appeared as an ally of the rebel Aizo.\textsuperscript{91} A more interesting association, though, is that of the accuser Senila with the beneficiaries of Bera’s fall. Senila and Gozhelm fled from the March together after the collapse of Bernard’s power at court, and were later captured by Lothar in Chalon-sur-Saône in 834, where they were both put to death.\textsuperscript{92} Senila’s main offence in Lothar’s eyes may have been his close association with this family, but it is also possible that resonances from the judicial destruction of Bera continued to ring fourteen years later.

If the family of Bernard had manipulated judicial processes to achieve a local predominance in 820, in 828 they were striking at larger game, and can only have achieved what they did as collaborators with a faction, best represented by the empress and her brothers, with a similar interest in dividing and discarding the ‘old guard’ amongst Louis’s advisers. However initially successful they were, the resulting strains were to prove fatal to the hopes of most of them and were to lead rapidly to civil war. For in dismissing his father-in-law the emperor deliberately offended Lothar, and in punishing the commanders of the Aquitanian army he also struck at Pippin, who had been given overall responsibility for the campaign, as well as having other ties to these aristocrats of the upper Loire valley.\textsuperscript{93} This slighting of his two eldest sons, their relatives, and allies marks the public opening of the political conflicts of the second half of Louis’s reign.

In such a light the events of the summer of 828 take on an ominous hue. In an assembly at Ingelheim in June Louis resolved to send Lothar and Pippin in person with Frankish and Aquitanian armies to the March. After a slow period of recruitment Lothar proceeded from Thionville to Lyons to rendezvous with Pippin. There at Lyons they remained, and there, as the annalist cryptically put it, ‘they talked’.\textsuperscript{94} Where, it is legitimate to wonder, was Agobard during these discussions? Contrary to the impression given by the \textit{Royal Frankish Annals}, a Muslim army, led by the Amir in person, was campaigning in the Ebro valley that year, even if it did not approach the March, and so the decision of the two Frankish rulers not to continue their advance but to disperse their forces and to return to Aachen and Aquitaine respectively looks somewhat surprising.\textsuperscript{95} Their discussions in Lyons were conceivably the last they held before the coup against their father in the spring of 830. In 829 Lothar was relegated to Italy and Bernard arrived in Aachen, the reward perhaps not only for his military services in 827 but also for the outcome of the assembly of 828, with its ultimately fatal adjustment to the balance of rival factions.\textsuperscript{96} The winter of 829/30 saw Hilduin, as arch-chancellor, still overseeing the addition of new entries to the court annals, but by early the following year he and the other survivors of the once dominant group of the emperor’s advisers were ready to join an open revolt against their master.

In the coup against the emperor and his recently appointed chamberlain in the spring of 830 Pippin I seems to have played a leading role, at least until the arrival from Italy in May of his elder brother Lothar. The sequence of events is more or less clear, though certain grey areas exist. In February of 830 an assembly was held at which a campaign against Brittany was projected, apparently entirely at the persuasion of Bernard.\textsuperscript{97} On 2 March the emperor left for the coast to begin preparations for the expedition, while his wife remained at Aachen. The whole undertaking, however, aroused growing disquiet and discontent, because of ‘the difficulty of the journey’, particularly amongst the nobility of western Neustria, the leading lights amongst whose number, Hugh and Matfrid, had so recently been disgraced.\textsuperscript{98} The nucleus of the ensuing rebellion was centred on Orleans, and Pippin of Aquitaine appears to have been directly involved, joining the conspirators at their point of assembly. In the light of the speed with which he and his forces were able to arrive from Italy, it also seems likely that Lothar was involved in the planning from an early stage.\textsuperscript{99} Indeed, so rapid was the sequence of events that it is hard not to suspect that some form of conspiracy had existed from an earlier date than the assembly of February 830, and that the Breton expedition provided a useful focus for the discontent rather than providing the cause of it. Though it must be admitted that so politically risky had military undertakings become since 827 that reluctance to take a lead in it on the part of counts and other office-holders is quite understandable.

The aims of the opposition were clear, at least in their first stages, and consisted of intentions to separate the emperor from his wife, limit if not end...
his personal authority, and kill Bernard. The concentration of forces for the forthcoming campaign against the Bretons enabled the conspirators to assemble an overwhelming military force. The very direction chosen for the expedition, crossing western Neustria, played into their hands. Their fore­

gathering at Paris in April seems to have brought the revolt into the open. No indication is given of any counter­moves that Louis did or could take, and Bernard seems to have fled immediately to the March, leaving one of his brothers to be blinded and exiled. Pippin and the leading Frankish conspira­

ators met the emperor at Compiegne on 24 April and there imposed their terms, which had the backing of Lothar, still not arrived from Italy. According to the annalist, Louis was deprived of his power, though what that implies in practice and what constitutional means were applied remain unclear, and Judith and her brothers were imprisoned by forcible admission to monasteries. The coup that had been carried out in the spring of 830, however, witnessed possibly the most dramatic realignment of factions and support in the whole troubled reign, and yet this is a process almost totally concealed from us in the sources. Both the _Annals of St Berin_ and the _Vita Hludovisci_ indicate the outcome: both are totally silent as to the details of how it was achieved. In an assembly held in October at Noyon the emperor formally recovered the full exercise of his authority, and the leaders of the conspiracy in the spring, who under Lothar must have been wielding power in the mean time, were taken into custody and held for a future hearing at Aachen. Those arrested are named as the abbots Helisachar, Wala, and Hilduin, and Count Lanbert. Hugh and Matfrid already seem to have made themselves scarce. At the same time the bishops and abbots there assembled declared the earlier judicial condemnation of Judith to be 'unjust and without law'.

The second stage of this 'counter-revolution' was delayed until the following spring, when at an assembly begun in February at Compiegne, the scene of the emperor’s humiliation nearly a year previous, and then transferred to Noyon, the conspirators were sentenced. The death penalties there imposed were commuted by Louis to various forms of imprisonment. There too the empress made her first reappearance and ‘following the judgement of the

Franks’ purged herself, probably by oath, of the charges that had been laid against her. These were the accusations of infidelity with Bernard, later to be given full rein in the _Epitaphium Arsenii_. The final stage may be seen as having occurred at the third assembly of the year, held at Thionville, at which Bernard presented himself to take a similar oath. He was not restored to office either at court or on the March. At the same time a reallocation of territories took place, in which Pippin of Aquitaine proved to be the main beneficiary, being immediately given the county of Anjou and the promise on his father’s death of receiving all of western Neustria between the Seine and the Loire.

The reason for linking the decisions of the Thionville assembly with the series of events stretching back to the gathering at Noyon in October 830 is not just that the oath taken by Bernard ended a series of protracted judicial processes, but also because there are grounds for suspecting that the territorial redistribution represented the payment made for a crucial switch of support on the part of Pippin I in the summer of 830. The coup that had been carried out in the spring of that year was largely the work of the Neustrian nobility and the partisans of Lothar, aided by the active support of Pippin. Some resentment of their actions in other regions, notably Austrasia, was inevitable, but it is unlikely that this would have been strong enough or well enough orchestrated to have brought about by itself the dramatic _volte-face_ of October 830.

Nithard, however, provides the key to these events in his brief references to how the emperor, in the power of Lothar, was able to forge a secret alliance with his two younger sons Pippin and Louis the German, using as his intermediary a monk called Gunthald, who visited their courts ostensibly to discuss religious matters. The offer made to them was of territorial additions to their kingdoms. Although Nithard implies that this was enough in itself, their attitude cannot have failed to have been influenced by the predominance achieved by Lothar as a result of the events of April and May. He had secured control of their father, rule over all of the Frankish regions proper, and had relegated his brothers to Aquitaine and Bavaria. In practice, the terms of the _Ordinatio_ of 817 had been put into premature effect. This was a state of affairs that neither Pippin nor Louis the German had any interest in prolonging. The result was a change of alliance and the humiliation of Lothar at the Noyon assembly, when Louis not only recovered his authority but also obliged his eldest son to sit with him in judgement on his own former associates. At the same time a political compromise was clearly devised in that whilst the leading non-royal conspirators were punished, and this meant the final elimination of
the ‘old guard’ of the emperor’s advisers of the first half of his reign, those who had manoeuvred to replace them were denied access to power. Bernard did not regain any of his offices and the empress’s brothers do not seem to have returned to influence. Moreover, the deliberate exclusion of the empress herself from the court throughout the winter of 830/1 and the oath imposed on her by the assembly constituted public humiliations and a weakening of her position.

In this way honour may have been satisfied, but it was largely done by the application of equality of injury to all parties. The only short-term beneficia­ries appear to have been Pippin and Louis the German. However, all of this had also created a vacuum at court, especially after the three elder sons were sent back to their kingdoms in the spring of 831. Who would succeed to the throne? The advisers of Louis the Pious in the last years of his reign are not easy to identify, particularly for the crucial period between the emperor’s recovery of power in October 830 and his losing it again in 833. For, whoever they were, they were responsible for making an astounding series of errors that succeeded in rapidly transforming a situation that was initially so beneficial to their master into another humiliating disaster. One aspirant at least was the monk Gunzbal, Louis’s diplomatic agent in the negotiations of the summer of 830, but Nithard implies that his bid to become secundus in imperio was thwarted, as were renewed manoeuvrings by Bernard. Nithard is indeed utterly reticent on the subject of the new advisers of Louis, whom he merely refers to as ‘ill, per quos tunc res publica tractabant’. One of this number was certainly Theoto, abbot of St Martin’s, Tours (where he had replaced Pippin’s ally Fridugis) and imperial arch-chancellor in 831–3. He was killed in the civil war of 834. He and his colleagues showed themselves to be remarkably unwise.

The first evidence of this comes in the treatment of Pippin I in the winter of 831. The king of Aquitaine’s reluctance to attend the winter court at Aachen is in itself indicative of his not expecting a friendly reception, and he delayed his arrival until just before Christmas. On 27 December he fled the court in secret, for reasons that are never explained. The events of 832 seem to confirm this impression of hostility on the part of the emperor’s new coterie of advisers towards his two younger sons, whose change of alliance had been so crucial in 830. Not only did Louis propose to take military action against Pippin for his flight from Aachen, but he was also faced by a genuine revolt on the part of his third son Louis the German, whose territorial reward had failed to materialize and who indeed had lost much of his potential kingdom in a reallocation of lands to his young half-brother Charles. The stance taken by Louis and his advisers may have seemed justified by, and possibly was predicated upon, the overwhelming military strength they were able to bring to bear to force both Louis the German and Pippin to submit by the autumn of 832. Although there is no suggestion that Pippin had engaged in armed rebellion, he was dispatched to detention in Trier, and early in 833 was formally deprived of his kingdom, which was given to Charles. This may have been Louis’s intention from the start, and to some extent he was successful. An influential body of opinion seems to have existed in Aquitaine that was prepared to support the emperor’s actions, just as was to happen again in 839. On the other hand, Louis’s cavalier treatment of his two sons and quite disproportionate attempts to augment the inheritance of their half-brother threw them back into the arms of Lothar again, an alliance that had been so laboriously dissolved in the summer of 830. Pippin was able to escape from his guards and return to Aquitaine, but there a number of leading men had taken the oath of allegiance to Charles. Pippin and his supporters could only hope to effect his restoration by throwing in their lot completely with Lothar, who already had the backing of the equally disaffected Louis the German, and a revival of the armed league of the spring of 830 was achieved. Thus it was Louis the Pious, or perhaps his advisers, who brought about the greatest political crisis of his reign, when the armies of all three of his elder sons, with Pope Gregory IV’s backing, advanced on him at the Rotfelde after the feast of Pentecost in 833. The ensuing disintegration of his own following before even a blow had been struck is surely testimony not so much to the persuasive arts of Lothar as to disquiet over the extreme measures Louis had been persuaded to indulge in during the brief years of his triumph over the conspiracy of 830.

However, if there was a greater fool than Louis the Pious it was probably Lothar. He had certainly not learnt any lessons from his previous short-lived ascendency. His regime and the treatment of their father seem rapidly to have brought a reversal of support on the part of his two brothers, once again relegated to their kingdoms and denied any influence in Francia proper. In this repeat of the realignment of forces that had occurred in 830 Louis the German appears to have taken the leading role in forging a confederacy against Lothar over the winter of 833/4. In a concerted move in spring 834 Louis the German and Pippin marched against their brother at Aachen, and then nearly cornered him at St-Denis before Easter, forcing him to flee and liberating their father and

111 Annales Bertini, s. a. 831, p. 4
112 Nithard, i. 4, ed. Lauer, pp. 12, 14
113 Annales Bertini, s. a. 834, p. 13; H. Bresslau, Handbuch der Urkundenlehre, 2 vols., 2nd edn. (Leipzig, 1912), i. 386
114 Annales Bertini, s. a. 831, 832, p. 5
115 Annales Bertini, s. a. 831, p. 4
116 Anon., Vita Hludovici, ch. 47, ed. Perz, p. 635
117 Nithard, i. 4, ed. Lauer, p. 14
118 Annales Bertini, s. a. 833, pp. 8, 9
119 Anon., Vita Hludovici, ch. 48, p. 636
120 Annales Bertini, s. a. 834, p. 11, Anon., Vita Hludovici, ch. 51, p. 638; Nithard, i. 4, ed. Lauer, p. 16
half-brother Charles. A formal reconciliation seems to have taken place between Louis the Pious and Pippin at this point. The latter's personal role in the brief civil war of the summer of 834, that was particularly bitterly fought in western Neustria but which, after some initial successes, prevented Lothar and his partisans from re-establishing themselves by force, is barely noted, though he does seem to have contributed troops to his father's cause.

In many respects the final years of the life of Pippin I are peculiarly shadowy as far as the wider events affecting the Carolingian empire are concerned. Auzias, following a Metz tradition, speculated that this may not have been the product of over-indulgence in alcohol. However, the years from 834 to 838 are marked by much royal activity inside Aquitaine, as testified to by the larger part of the extant charters. Also, as suggested by the cryptic reference in the *Annals of St Berin*, the difficulties with Gascony may have become acute at this time. At any rate Pippin showed no signs of discontent under the restored 'hégémony of the old emperor, unlike his younger brother Louis the German, and in the autumn of 837 he was prepared to see the west Neustrian lands, promised to him in 831, reallocated as part of the future portion of Charles. In the light of his breach in 834 with powerful elements in the Neustrian aristocracy who supported Lothar this may not have been too serious a loss. The same year also saw Pippin's compliance with the imperially backed injunctions of the synod held at Aachen in respect of his precarial grants, perhaps a potentially serious curtailing of his powers of political patronage within the kingdom.

What then is to be made of this element of passivity on the part of Pippin in these final years? In part it may be a response to a more generally conciliatory and tactful policy on the part of Louis the Pious and his advisers, and certainly this period saw father and son in greatest harmony in the promotion of monastic reform and endowment. However, an additional factor needs to be added to the equation. When Pippin I died in December 838 one body of opinion in Aquitaine was united in support of the dead king's elder son, who was rapidly proclaimed and crowned as Pippin II. The refusal to recognize the succession of his grandson and armed intervention by the emperor in Aquitaine in 839 to impose his son Charles on the kingdom instead were peculiarly successful. Amongst those reported to have collaborated immediately with Louis the Pious were not only Bishop Ebroin of Poitiers, a former chancellor of the kingdom, but also the counts Rather of Limoges and Gerhard of Bourges, both of whom were brothers-in-law of Pippin II. Others who may have collaborated at this time and certainly did subsequently support Charles the Bald against Pippin II in 840 include Bishop Moduin of Autun, Count Autbert of Avalon, and Count Reinoldus of Herbauge. In other words, most of the leading men of northern Aquitaine and the three Burgundian counties attached to the kingdom actively supported the emperor against the son of their former king. The success of Louis the Pious in imposing his authority on northern Aquitaine in 839 looks like a repeat of his similar achievement in 832, and suggests that there existed in these regions at least a fundamental level of support for the emperor and a corresponding lack of any form of Aquitanian 'nationalist' sympathy capable of coalescing around the person of a purely local ruler. When Pippin II did draw support, as perhaps his father had done before him in 832–3, was from the lands east of the Garonne and in particular the March centred on Toulouse. The dukes of Gascony, as in 768 and 848–52, may be assumed to have played a watching game. If this supposition is true, Pippin's actions during the crises of 829–34 may have been conditioned not only by the dictates of self-interest and political fluctuations outside the borders of his kingdom but also by the existence within the realm of a fundamental body of loyalty towards an emperor who himself for over thirty years had been king of Aquitaine.

The events of 832, and above all of 839–40, must give additional weight to the suspicions of those who have argued that the Carolingian kingdom of Aquitaine was essentially an artificial creation, with little grounding in the traditions of the independent duchy of the eighth century. On the only two occasions in its relatively brief existence that the Aquitanian realm was challenged by the power of the central authority of the Frankish state, not only was it incapable of putting up an effective military resistance, but also, and far more significantly, its leading men co-operated swiftly and willingly with the invader. Neither in 832 nor in 839 did a sense of solidarity manifest itself within the kingdom, nor was Pippin II able to mobilize any form of Aquitanian 'national' sentiment in his unsuccessful struggle with Charles the Bald, who, unlike Louis the Pious, had no prior association with the kingdom. It is thus perhaps unnecessary to accuse Charles of failing to learn the lessons of effective Carolingian government in Aquitaine. His personal absence...
from the kingdom and the neglect of its central administrative institutions may rather be a reflection of the lessons of the 830s and early 840s, which seemed to indicate clearly enough that the ruler of Western Francia could rely on a powerful body of indigenous support, at least in the north of Aquitaine, without having to do anything to earn it. If anything was significantly new in the Aquitaine of Charles the Bald it was the scale of the attacks of the Vikings.

If a contrast be needed to highlight these points, then comparison with the position of Louis the German in Bavaria proves illuminating. Although militarily able to bring his third son to heel in 832, the Emperor Louis was certainly in no position to take punitive measures against him of the kind contemplated in the case of Pippin, and in 839–40 Louis the German was again able to initiate an armed conflict with his father with the backing of his own magnates. The proposed boundaries of the future kingdom of Charles shifted ever further westward during the course of the emperor’s reign. In particular, if Alamannia was less secure, Louis the German’s standing in Bavaria was well grounded, and this despite the Bavarian origins of the Empress Judith and her family. In this case the possession of a regional monarchy seems to have mattered in a way that it did not in Aquitaine.

Thus, perhaps, Louis the German can be seen as the successor of Tassilo and the Agilolfings in ways that Pippin was clearly not that of Waiofar and Hunold.

One other crucial distinction between Pippin and his Aquitanian predecessors should be noticed. The latter were able to rely for their protracted resistance to Carolingian control on a major source of military manpower in the form of Basque mercenaries. This was a resource denied to Pippin, faced by continual difficulties with the Basques and the counts and dukes who governed them. When Pippin is found taking effective military action that is hostile to the authority of the emperor it is only with the backing of the aristocracy of western Neustria, as in 830. In 827 Neustrian magnates were appointed to command forces raised under the authority of the king of Aquitaine. This is not necessarily to deny the Aquitanians a military potential, but it rarely features as a significant one. Where there seems to have been real strength was in the valley of the upper Loire and the related Breton Marches, and also in the various frontier regions of the northern Pyrenees. Of these, virtually all of the former area, together with the Spanish March centred on Barcelona, lay outside the boundaries of the kingdom. Gascony looks to have been beyond effective royal control by the 830s, leaving only the central Pyrenean March of Toulouse and perhaps the Limousin not only as the sole such marcher areas under Pippin I’s rule but also as the only regions in which he and his son could draw upon a personal loyalty. In the circumstances of the divided nature of his kingdom and the tangled skein of the wider political conflicts of the Carolingian empire in his father’s reign the various shifts both of fortune and alliance of Pippin I of Aquitaine may thus begin to make sense, but it must be remembered that he is only one of the actors in the extraordinarily complicated drama of the events of the 820s and 830s, if, however, a more significant and a more interesting one than his historiographical reputation has hitherto suggested.