taine and originall, whence the pleaders gather their ar-
guments and reasons to prooue what they vndertake.
And this worke (for certaine) is performed by the dis-
course: which power if the pleader want, he shall neuer
skill to shape an argument though he haue the whole ci-
uill law at his fingers ends. This we see plainly to befall
in such as studie the art of oratorie, when the aptnesse
thereunto is failing: for though they learne by art the
Topicks of *Cicero*, being the spring from which flow the
arguments that may be inuented to prooue euery pro-
bleme, both on the affirmatiue and the negatiue part: yet
they cannot thereout shape a reason. Againe, there
come others of great wit and towardnes; who without
looking in booke or studying the Topicks, make 1000
arguments seruing for the purpose, as occasion requi-
reth.

This selfe falleth out in the lawyers of good memo-
rie, who will recite you a whole text very perfectly, and
yet of so great a multitude of lawes, as are compriſed
therein; cannot collect so much as one argument to
prooue their inuention. And contrariwise, others who
haue studied simply without books, and without allow-
ance, worke miracles in pleading of causes. Hence we
know how much it importeth the common-wealth, that
there may be such an election and examination of wits
for the sciences; inasmuch as some without art know
and vnderstand what they are to effect: and others lo-
den with precepts and rules, for that they want a conue-
nient towardnesse for practise, commit a thousand ab-
surdities, which very ill become them. So then, if to
iudge & plead, be effected by distinguishing, inferring,
arguing, & chusing, it standeth with reason that whoso-
euer betteth himselfe to studie the lawes, enioy a good
vnder-

vnderſtanding, ſeeing that ſuch actions appertain to this power, and not to the memorie or to the imagination. How we may finde whether a child be endowed with this difference of wit or no, it would do well to vnderſtand: but firſt it behoooueth to lay downe what are the qualities of diſcourſe, & how many differences it compriſeth in it ſelfe, to the end we may likewiſe know with diſtinction, to which of theſe the lawes appertaine: for the firſt, we muſt weet, that albeit the vnderſtanding be the moſt noble power, and of greateſt dignitie in man; yet there is none which is more eaſily led into errour (as touching the trueth) than the vnderſtanding. This *Ariſtotle* attempted to prooue when he ſaid, That the ſenſe is euer true, but the vnderſtanding (for the moſt part) diſcourſeth badly; the which is plainly ſeen by experience: for if it were not ſo amongſt the Diuines, the Phiſitions, the Philoſophers, and the Lawyers, there would not fall out ſo manie waightie diſſentions, ſo diuers opinions, and ſo many iudgements and conceits vpon euery point, ſeeing the trueth is neuer more than one. Whence it groweth, that the ſenſes hold ſo great a certaintie in their obiects, and the vnderſtanding is ſo eaſily beguiled in his, may well be conceiued if we conſider that the obiects of the fiue ſenſes, and the ſpices by which they are known, haue their being, reall, firme, and ſtable by nature before they are knowen. But that truth which is to be contemplated by the vnderſtanding, if it ſelfe do not frame and faſhion the ſame, it hath no formall being of his owne; but is wholly ſcattered and loſe in his materials, as a houſe conuerted into ſtones, earth, timber & titles, with which ſo many errors may be committed in building, as there ſhall men ſet themſelues to build with ill imagination.

The like befalleth in the building which the vnderſtanding raiſeth when it frameth a trueth: for if the wit be not good, all the reſidue wil worke a thouſand follies with the ſelfe ſame principles. Hence ſprings it that amongſt men there are ſo ſundrie opinions touching one ſelfe matter: for euery one maketh the compoſition and figure ſuch as is his vnderſtanding.

From theſe errours and opinions are the fiue ſenſes free: for neither the eies make the colour, nor the taſt the ſauours, nor the feeling the palpable qualities; but the whole is made and compounded by nature before anie of them be acquainted with his obiect. Men becauſe they carrie not regard to this bad operation of the vnderſtanding, take hardineſſe to deliuer confidently their owne opinion, without knowing (in certaintie) of what ſort their wit is, and whither it can faſhion a truth well or ill. And if we be not reſolued heerein, let vs ask ſome of theſe learned mē, who after they haue ſet down in writing, and confirmed their opinions with many arguments and reaſons, and haue another time changed their opinions and conceit, when or how they can aſſure themſelues, that (now at laſt) they haue hit the nail on the head: themſelues will not denie, but that they erred the firſt time, ſeeing they vnſay what they ſaid tofore.

Secondly, I auouch that they ought to haue the leſſe confidence in their vnderſtanding, becauſe the power which once ill compoundeth the trueth, whileſt his patrone placed ſo much aſſurance in his argumentes and reaſons, ſhould therefore the ſooner take ſuſpect, that he may once again ſlide into error whileſt he worketh with the ſelfe ſame inſtrument of reaſon; and ſo much the rather for that it hath been ſeen by experiences, that the

firſt

firſt opinion hath borne moſt trueth, and afterwards he hath relied vpon a worſe, and of leſſe probabilitie. They hold it for a ſufficient token, that the vnderſtanding compoundeth well a trueth, when they ſee it enamored of ſuch a figure; and that there are arguments & reaſons which moue it to conclude in that ſort: and verily they miſſe their cuſhion, for the ſame vnderſtanding carrieth the ſame proportion to his falſe opinions, that the inferiour powers haue each with the differences of their obiect: for if we demand of the Phiſitions, what meat is beſt and moſt ſauoury of al that men accuſtomably feed vpon, I beleeue they will anſwere, that for men who are diſtempered and of weake ſtomacke, there is none abſolutely good or euil, but ſuch as the ſtomacke is that ſhall receiue it: for there are ſtomacks (ſaith *Galen*) which better brooke beefe than hennes or cracknels, and other-ſome abhorre egges and milke: and others againe haue a longing after them: and in the maner of vſing meates, ſome like roſt, and ſome boild: and in roſt, ſome loue to haue the bloud run in the diſh, and ſome to haue it browne and burned, And (which is more worthie of conſideration) that meat which this day is ſauourly eaten, and with good appetite, to morrow will be lothed, and a farre worſe longed for in his roome. All this is vnderſtood when the ſtomacke is good and ſound: but if it fall into a certain infirmitie, which the Phiſitions call Pica, or Malacia, then ariſe longings after things, which mans nature abhorreth: ſo as they eate earth, coles, and lime, with greater appetite than hennes or trouts. If we paſſe on to the faculty generatiue, we ſhall find as many appetites & varieties: for ſome men loue a foule woman, and abhorre a faire: others caſt better liking to a foole than her that is wiſe; a fat wench is fulſome, and a leane

haue their liking, ſilks & braue attire offend ſome mens fancies, who leeſe themſelues after one that totters in her ragges. This is vnderſtood when the genitall partes are in their ſoundneſſe: but if they fall into their infirmitie of ſtomacke, which is termed Malacia, they couet deteſtable beaſtlineſſe. The ſame befalleth in the facultie ſenſitiue: for of the palbable qualities hard and ſoft, rough and ſmooth, hot and cold, moiſt and drie, there is none of them which can content euery ones feeling: for there are men who take better reſt on a hard bed than a ſoft, & other ſom better on a ſoft than a hard. All this varietie of ſtrange taſts & appetites, is found in the compoſitions, framed by the vnderſtanding: for if we aſſemble 100 men of learning and propound a particular queſtion, ech of them deliuereth a ſeuerall iudgement, and diſcourſeth thereof in different maner. One ſelfe argument to one ſeemeth a ſophiſticall reaſon, to another probable; and ſome you ſhall meet with, to whoſe capacitie it concludeth as if it were a demonſtration. And this is not onely true in diuerſe vnderſtandings, but we ſee alſo by experience that one ſelfe reaſon concludeth to one ſelfe vnderſtanding, at one time thus-wiſe, and at another time otherwiſe: ſo much that euerie day men varie in opinion; ſome by proceſſe of time purging their vnderſtanding, know the default of reaſon, which firſt ſwaied them, and others leeſing the good temperature of their braine, abhorre the trueth, and giue allowance to a leaſing. But if the braine fall into the infirmitie, which is termed *Malacia*, then we ſhal ſee ſtrange iudgements and compoſitions, arguments falſe and weake to proue more forcibly than ſuch as carrie ſtrength and trueth; to good arguments, an anſwere ſhaped, and to bad a condeſcending: from the premiſſes, whence a right

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concluſion may be collected, they gather a wrong, and by ſtrange arguments, and fond reaſons, they prooue their bad imaginations. This, graue and learned men duely aduiſing, labour to deliuer their opinion, concealling the reaſons whereon they ground: for men perſuade themſelues, that ſo farre mans authoritie auaileth, as the reaſon is of force on which he buildeth, and the arguments reſting ſo indifferent for cõcluding through the diuerſitie of vnderſtandings, euerie man giueth a iudgement of the reaſon conformably to the wit which he poſſeſſeth: for which cauſe it is reputed greater grauitie to ſay, This is mine opinion, for certaine reaſons which moue me ſo to thinke; than to diſplay the arguments whereon he relieth. But if they be enforced to render a reaſon of their opinion, they ouerſlip not anie argument, how ſlight ſoeuer: for that which they leaſt valued, with ſome concludeth and worketh more effect, than the moſt vrgent. Wherein the great miſerie of our vnderſtanding is diſcouered, which compoundeth, and diuideth, argueth, and reaſoneth, and at laſt (when it is growen to a concluſion) is void of proofe or light, which may make it diſcern whether his opinion be true or no.

This ſelfe vncertaintie haue the diuines in matters which appertaine not to the faith: for after they haue argued at full, they cannot then aſſure themſelues of anie infalliable proofe or euident ſucceſſe that may diſcouer, which reaſons carried greateſt waight; and ſo euerie diuine caſteth how he may beſt ground himſelf, and anſwer with moſt apparence to the aduerſe parties arguments, his owne reputation ſaued, and this is all whereabouts he muſt beſtow his endeuour. But the charge of a Phiſition, and a Generall in the field, after he hath well

diſcourſed and refuted the grounds of the contrary partie, is to marke the ſucceſſe, which if it be good, he ſhal be held for diſcreet; if bad, all men will know that he relied vpon guileſull reaſons.

In matters of faith propounded by the Church, there can befall none error: for God, beſt weeting how vncertaine mens reaſons are, and with how great facilitie they runne headlong to be deceiued, conſenteth not that matters ſo high and of ſo waightie importance, ſhould reſt vpon our onely determination: but when two or three are gathered togither in his name, with the ſolemnitie of the Church, he forthwith entreth into the midſt of them, as preſident of the action, and ſo giueth allowance to that which they ſay well, and reaueth their errours, and of himſelfe reuealeth that, to whoſe notice by humane forces we cannot attaine. The proofe then which the reaſons formed in matters of faith muſt receiue, is to aduiſe well whether they prooue or inferre the ſame; which the Catholicke church ſaith and declareth: for if they collect ought to the contrarie, then (without doubt) they are faultie: but in other queſtions where the vnderſtanding hath libertie of diſcourſe, there hath not yet any maner bin aduiſed to know what reaſons conclude, nor when the vnderſtanding doth well compound a trueth: onely we relie vpon the good conſonance which they make, and that is an argument which may erre: for manie falſe points carrie better apparence and likelier proofe of truth, than the true themſelues.

Phiſitions, and ſuch as commaund in martiall affairs, haue ſucceſſe and experience for proofe of their reaſons. For if ten captains proue by many reaſons, that it is beſt to ioine battaile, and ſo many (on the other ſide) defend

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the contrarie, that which ſucceedeth, will confirme the one opinion, and conuince the other. And if two Phiſitions diſpute whether the patient ſhall die or liue, after he is cured or deceaſſed, it will appeare whoſe reaſon was beſt. But for all this, the ſucceſſe is yet no ſufficient proofe, for whereas an effect hath many cauſes, it may very well betide happily for one cauſe, and yet the reaſons (perhaps) were grounded on a contrary. *Ariſtotle* moreouer affirmeth, that to know what reaſons conclude, it is good to enſue the common opinion; for if many wiſemen ſay and affirme one ſelfe thing, and all conclude with the ſame reaſons, it is a ſigne (though topical) that they are concluſiue, and that they compound well the truth. But who ſo taketh this into due conſideration, ſhall find it a proofe ſubiect alſo vnto beguiling, for in the forces of the vnderſtanding, waight is of more preheminence than number: for it fareth not in this, as in bodily forces, that when many ioine together to lift vp a waight, they preuaile much, and when few, but little: but to attaine to the notice of a truth deepely hidden, one high vnderſtanding is of more value, than 100000 which are not comparable thereunto; and the reaſon is, becauſe the vnderſtandings helpe not each other, neither of many make one, as it fals out in bodily powers. Therefore well ſayd the wiſe man, Haue many peace-makers, but take one of a thouſand to be thy coũſellor; as if he ſhould ſay, Keepe for thy ſelfe many friends who may defend thee when thou ſhalt be driuen to come to hand-ſtrokes, but to aske councell, chuſe onely one amongſt a thouſand. Which ſentence was alſo expreſſed by *Heraclitus*, who ſayd, One with me is worth a thouſand. In contentions and cauſes, euery learned man bethinketh how he may beſt ground himſelfe

on reaſon, but after he hath well reuolued euery thing, there is no art which can make him know with aſſurance whether his vnderſtanding haue made that compoſition which in iuſtice is requiſit: for if one pleader proue with law in hand, that reaſon ſtandeth on the demandants ſide, and another by way alſo of the law, prooueth the like for the defendant, what remedie ſhall we deuiſe, to know which of the two pleaders hath formed his reaſons beſt? The ſentence of the Iudge maketh no demonſtration of true iuſtice, neither can the ſame be tearmed a ſucceſſe, for his ſentence (alſo) is but an opinion, & he doth none other than cleaue to one of the two pleaders: and to increaſe the number of learned men in one ſelfe opinion, is no argument to perſuade that what they reſolue vpon is therefore true, for we haue alreadie affirmed and prooued, that many weake capacities (though they ioine in one to diſcouer ſome darke conceiued truth) ſhall neuer ariue to the power and force of ſome one alone, if the ſame be an vnderſtāding of high reach. And that the ſentence of the Iudge maketh no demonſtration, is plainly ſeene, in that at another higher ſeat of iuſtice they reuerſe the ſame and giue a diuerſe iudgement, and (which is woorſt) it may ſo fall, that the inferiour iudge, was of an abler capacitie than the ſuperiour, and his opinion more conformable vnto reaſon. And that the ſentence of the ſuperiour iudge, is not a ſufficient proofe of iuſtice neither, it is a matter very manifeſt, for in the ſame actions, and from the ſame iudges, without adding or reauing any one iot, we ſee daily contrarie ſentences to iſſue. And he that once is deceiued by placing confidence in his owne reaſons, falleth duly into ſuſpect, that he may be deceiued of new. Wherethrough we ſhould the leſſe relie vpon his opinion, For he

he that is once naught (ſayth the wiſeman) chace him from thee. Pleaders, ſeeing the great varietie of vnderſtandings which poſſeſſe the iudges, and that each of them is affectionat to the reaſon which beſt ſquareth with his wit, and that ſometime they take ſatisfaction at one argument, & ſometimes aſſent to the contrary, they thereupon boldly thruſt themſelues foorth to defend euery cauſe in controuerſie, both on the part affirmatiue and the negatiue; and this ſo much the rather, becauſe they ſee by experience, that in the one maner and the other, they haue a ſentence in their fauour, and ſo that comes very rightly to be verefied, which wiſdome ſayd, The thoughts of mortal men are timorous, and their foreſights vncertaine. The remedie then which we haue againſt this, ſeeing the reaſons of the lawyer faile in proote and experience, ſhall be, to make choiſe of men of great vnderſtanding, who may be iudges and pleaders; For the reaſons and arguments of ſuch (ſayth *Ariſtotle*) are no leſſe certaine and firme, than experience it ſelfe. And by making this choice, it ſeemeth that the cõmon wealth reſteth aſſured that her officers ſhall adminiſter iuſtice. But if they giue them all ſcope, to enter without making trial of their wit, as the vſe is at this day, the inconueniences (which we haue noted) will euermore befall.

By what ſignes it may be knowne, that he who ſhall ſtudie the lawes, hath the difference of wit requiſit to this faculrie, heretofore (after a ſort) we haue expreſſed, but yet, to renew it to the memorie, and to proque the ſame more at large, we muſt know, that the child who being ſet to read, ſoone learneth to know his letters, and can pronounce euery one with facilitie, according as they be placed in the A B C, giueth token that he ſhall be endowed

endowed with much memorie, for ſuch a worke as this (for certaine) is not performed by the vnderſtanding, nor by the imagination, but it appertaineth vnto the office of the memorie, to preſerue the figures of things, and to report the natures of each, when occaſion ſo requireth, and where much memorie dwelleth, we haue prooued before, that default of vnderſtanding alſo raigneth.

To write alſo with ſpeed, and a faire hand, we ſayd that it bewraid an imagination, wherethrough the child who in few daies will frame his hand, and write his lines right, and his letters euen and with good forme and figure, yeeldeth ſigne of meane vnderſtanding, for this worke is performed by the imagination, and theſe two powers encounter in that contrarietie which we haue alreadie ſpoken of and noted.

And if being ſet to Grammer he learne the ſame with little labour, and in ſhort time make good Latines, and write fine epiſtles, with the well ruled cloſes of *Cicero*, he ſhall neuer be good iudge nor pleader, for it is a ſigne that he hath much memorie, and (ſaue by great miracle) he will be of ſlender diſcourſe. But if ſuch a one wax obſtinat in plodding at the lawes, and ſpend much time in the ſchooles, he will prooue a famous reader, and ſhall haue a ſtint of many hearers, for the latine tongue is very gratious in chaires, and to read with great ſhow, there are requiſit many allegations, and to fardell vp in euery law, whatſoeuer hath bene writen touching the ſame; and to this purpoſe, memorie is of more neceſſitie than diſcourſe. And albeit it is true, that in the chaire he be to diſtinguiſh, inferre, argue, iudge and chuſe, to gather the true ſenſe of the law; yet in the end he putteth the caſe as beſt liketh himſelfe, he mooues doubts, maketh obiections,

obiections, and giueth ſentence after his own will, without that any gainſaie him: for which a meane diſcourſe is ſufficient. But when one pleader ſpeaketh for the plaintife, and another for the defendant, and a third lawyer ſupplieth the iudges place; this is a true controuerſie, & men cannot ſpeake ſo at randon, as when they skirmiſh without an aduerſarie. And if the childe profit ſtenderly in Grammer, we may thereby gather, that he hath a good diſcourſe, I ſay, we may ſo coniecture, becauſe it followeth not of neceſſitie, that whoſoeuer cannot learne Latine, hath therefore ſtraightwaies a good diſcourſe, ſeeing we haue prooued tofore, that children of good imagination neuer greatly profit in the Latine tongue; but that which may beſt diſcouer this, is Logicke: for this ſcience carieth the ſame proportion with the vnderſtanding, as the touchſtone with gold. Where-through it falleth out certaine, that if he who taketh leſſon in the arts, begin not within a month or two to diſcourſe and to caſt doubts; and if there come not in his head arguments and anſwers in the matter which is treated of, he is void of diſcourſe: but if he proue towardly in his ſcience; it is an infallible argument that he is endued with a good vnderſtanding for the lawes, and ſo he may forthwith addict himſelf to ſtudie them without longer tarying. Albeit I would hold it better done, firſt to run through the arts, becauſe Logicke, in reſpect of the vnderſtanding, is nought els than thoſe ſhackles which we clap on the legs of an vntrained Mule, which going with them many daies, taketh a ſteddy and ſeemly pace. Such a march doth the vnderſtanding make in his diſputations, when it firſt bindeth the ſame with the rules and precepts of Logicke: but if this child, whom we go thus-wiſe examining, reape no profit in the Latine

tine tongue, neither can come away with Logicke as were requiſite, it behooueth to trie whether he poſſeſſe a good imagination, ere we take him from the laws; for herein is lapped vp a very great ſecret, and it is good that the common wealth be done to ware thereof, and it is, that there are ſome lawyers, who getting vp into the chaire, work miracles in interpreting the texts, & others in pleading: but if you put the ſtaffe of iuſtice into their hands, they haue no more abilitie to gouerne, than as if the lawes had neuer been enacted to any ſuch end. And contrariwiſe, ſome other there are who with three miſvnderſtood lawes, which they haue learned at all aduentures; being placed in any gouernment, there cannot more be deſired at any mans handes than they will performe. At which effect, ſome curious wits take wonder, becauſe they ſinck not into the depth of the cauſe, from whence it may grow. And the reaſon is, that gouernment appertaineth to the imagination, and not to the vnderſtanding nor the memorie. And that this is ſo, the matter may verie manifeſtly be prooued, conſidering that the common-wealth is to be compounded with order & concert, with euery thing in his due place, which all put togither maketh good figure & correſpondence. And this (ſundrie times heeretofore) we haue prooued to be a worke of the imagination: and it ſhall prooue nought els to place a great lawyer to be a gouernour, than to make a deafe man a Iudge in muſicke; but this is ordinarily to be vnderſtood, & not as an vniuerſall rule: for we haue alreadie prooued it is poſſible that nature can vnite great vnderſtanding with much imagination: ſo ſhall there follow no repugnancie to be a good pleader and a famous gouernour: and we heeretofore diſcouered, that nature being endowed with all the forces which

which ſhe may poſſeſſe, and with matter well ſeaſoned, will make a man of great memorie, and of great vnderſtanding, and of much imagination; who ſtudying the lawes, will proove a famous reader, a great pleader, and no leſſe gouernor, but nature makes ſo few ſuch, as this cannot paſſe for a generall rule.

CHAP. XII.

How it may be prooued, that of Theoricall Phiſicke, part appertaineth to the memorie, and part to the vnderſtanding, and the practicke to the imagination.

WHat time the *Arabian* Phiſicke flouriſhed, there was a Phiſition very famous, aſwell in reading, as in writing, arguing, diſtinguiſhing, anſwering, and concluding; who, men would thinke in reſpect of his profound knowledge, were able to reuiue the dead, and to heale any diſeaſe whatſoeuer, and yet the contrary came to paſſe: for he neuer tooke anie patient in cure, who miſcarried not vnder his hands. Wherat greatly ſhaming, and quite out of countenance, he went and made himſelfe a frier, complaining on his euill fortune, and not able to conceiue the cauſe how he came ſo to miſſe. And becauſe the freſheſt examples afford ſureſt proof, and do moſt ſway the vnderſtanding, it was held by many graue Phiſitions, that *Iohn Argentier*, a phiſition of our time, farre ſurpaſſed *Galen* in reducing the art of phiſicke to a better method: and yet for all this it is reported of him, that he was ſo infortunat in practiſe, as no patient of his countrey durſt take phiſicke at

at his hands, fearing ſome diſmall ſucceſſe. Hereat it ſeemeth the vulgar haue good reaſon to maruell, ſeeing by experience (not onely in thoſe rehearſed by vs: but alſo in many others with whom men haue dayly to deale) that if the Phiſition be a great clearke: for the ſame reaſon he is vnfit to miniſter.

Of this effect *Ariſtotle* procured to render a reaſon, but could not find it out. He thought that the cauſe why the reaſonable Phiſitions of his time failed in curing, grew for that ſuch men had only a generall notice, and knew not euerie particular complexion, contrarie to the Empiricks, whoſe principal ſtudy bent it ſelf to know the properties of euery ſeuerall perſon, and let paſſe the generall; but he was void of reaſon, for both the one and the other exerciſed themſelues about particular cures, & endeuoured (ſo much as in them lay) to know ech ones nature ſingly by it ſelfe. The difficultie then conſiſteth in nothing els than to know, for what cauſe ſo well learned phiſitions, though they exerciſe themſelues all their life long in curing, yet neuer grow skilfull in practiſe, and yet other ſimple ſoules with three or foure rules, learned very ſoone: and the ſcholers can more skill of miniſtring than they.

The true anſwere of this doubt holdeth no little difficultie, ſeeing that *Ariſtotle* could not finde it out, nor render (at leaſt in ſome ſort) any part therof. But grounding on the prinicples of our doctrine, we will deliuer the ſame: for we muſt know that the perfection of a phiſition conſiſteth in two things, no leſſe neceſſarie to attaine the end of his art, than two legges are to go without halting. The firſt is, to weet by way of method, the precepts and rules of curing men in generall, without deſcending to particulars. The ſecond, to be long time

exercised in practise, and to haue visited many patients: for men are not so different ech from other, but that in diuers things they agree; neither so conioyned, but that there rest in them particularities of such condition, as they can neuer be deliuered by speech, nor written, nor taught, nor so collected, as that they may be reduced into art: but to know them, is onely granted to him, who hath often seen and had them in handling. Which may easily be conceiued, considering that mans face, being composed of so small a number of parts, as are two eies, a nose, two ckeeks, a mouth, & a forehead, nature shapeth yet therein so manie compositions and combinations, as if you assemble togither 100000 men, ech one hath a countenance so different from other, and proper to himselfe, that it falleth out a miracle, to find two who do altogither resemble. The like betideth in the foure elements, & in the 4 first qualities, hot, cold, moist, and drie, by the harmonie of which, the life and health of man is compounded: and of so slender a number of parts, nature maketh so many proportions, that if a 100000 men be begotten, ech of them comes to the world with a health so peculier and proper to himselfe, that if God should on the sodaine miraculously change their proportion of these first qualities, they would all become sicke, except some two or three, that by great disposition had the like consonance and proportion. Whence two conclusions are necessarily inferred. The first is, that euerie man who falleth sicke, ought to be cured conformable to his particular proportiõ; in sort, that if the phisition restore him not to his first consonance of humours, he cannot recouer. The second that to performe this as it ought, is requisite the phisition haue first seen & dealt with the patient sundry times in his health,

by feeling his pulſe, peruſing his ſtate, and what maner countenance and complexion he is of, to the end that when he ſhall fall ſicke, he may iudge how farre he is from his health, and in miniſtring vnto him, may know to what point he is to reſtore him. For the firſt, (namely to weet and vnderſtand the Theorick and compoſition of the art) ſaith *Galen*, it is neceſſary to be endowed with great diſcourſe and much memorie: for the one part of phiſick conſiſteth in reaſon, and the other in experience and hiſtorie. To the firſt is vnderſtanding requiſite, and to the other memorie, and it reſting a matter of ſo great difficultie, to vnite theſe two powers in a large degree; it followeth of force that the phiſition become vnapt for the Theorick. Where through we behold many Phiſitions, learned in the Greeke & Latine tongue, and great Anotomiſts and Simpliciſts (all workes of the memory) who brought to arguing or diſputation, or to finde out the cauſe of anie effect that appertaineth to the vnderſtanding, can ſmall skill thereof.

The contrarie befalleth in others, who ſhew great wit and ſufficiencie in the Logicke and Philoſophie of this art, but being ſet to the Latine and Greeke tongue, touching ſimples and anotomies, can do little, becauſe memory in them is wanting: for this cauſe *Galen* ſaid verie well, That it is no maruell, if among ſo great a multitude of men, who practiſe the exerciſe and ſtudie of the art of Phiſicke and Philoſophie, ſo few are found to profit therein, and yeelding the reaſon, he ſaith, It requires a great toile to find out a wit requiſite for this Science; or a maiſter who can teach the ſame with perfection, or can ſtudie it with diligence and attention. But with all theſe reaſons *Galen* goeth groping, for he could not hit the cauſe whence it comes to paſſe, that few perſons profit

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in Phiſick. Yet in ſaying it was a great labour to find out a wit requiſit for this ſcience, he ſpake truth; albeit he did not ſo far forth ſpecifie the ſame, as we will; namely, for that it is ſo difficult a matter to vnite a great vnderſtanding with much memorie, no man attaineth to the depth of Theoricall phiſick. And for that there is found a repugnancie between the vnderſtanding and the imagination (whereunto we will now prooue, that practiſe and the skill to cure with certaintie appertaineth) it is a miracle to find out a Phiſition, who is both a great *Theoriſt*; and withall a great practitioner, or contrariwiſe a great practitioner, and very well ſeen in Theorick. And that the Imagination, and not the vnderſtanding is the power, wherof the phiſition is to ſerue himſelf, in knowing and curing the diſeaſes of particular perſons, may eaſily be prooued.

Firſt of all preſuppoſing the doctrine of *Ariſtotle*, who affirmeth, That the vnderſtanding cannot know particulars; neither diſtinguiſh the one from the other, nor diſcerne the time and place, & other particularities which make men different ech from other: and that euery one is to be cured after a diuers maner; and the reaſon is (as the vulgar Philoſophers auouch) for that the vnderſtanding is a ſpirituall power, and cannot be altered by the particulars which are repleniſhed with matter. And for this cauſe *Ariſtotle* ſaid, That the ſence is of particulars, and the vnderſtanding of vniuerſals.

If then medicines are to worke in particulars, and not in vniuerſals (which are vnbegotten, and vncorruptible) the vnderſtanding falleth out to be a power impertinent for curing. Now the difficultie conſiſteth in diſcerning why men of great vnderſtanding, cānot poſſeſſe good outward ſenſes for the particulars, they be-

ing powers ſo repugnant; And the reaſon is very plain, and this is it, that the outward ſenſes cannot well performe their operations, vnleſſe they be aſſiſted with a good imagination, and this we are to prooue by the opinion of *Ariſtotle*, who going about to expreſſe what the imagination was, ſaith it is a motion cauſed by the outward ſenſe, in ſort as the colour, which multiplieth by the thing coloured, doth alter the eie. And ſo it fareth that this ſelfe colour, which is in the chriſtallin humour, paſſeth farther into the imagination, and maketh therin the ſame figure which was in the eie. And if you demād of which ō theſe two kinds the notice of the particular is made, all philoſophers auouch (and that verie truely) that the ſecond figure is it which altereth the imagination, and by them both is the notice cauſed, conformable to that ſo commō ſpeech, From the obiect, and from the power the notice ſpringeth. But from the firſt which is in the chriſtallin humour, & from the ſightfull power, groweth no notice, if the imagination be not attentiue thereunto, which the phiſitions do plainly prooue, ſaying, That if they lance or ſear the fleſh of a diſeaſed perſon, who for al that feeleth no pain, it ſhews a token that his imagination is diſtracted into ſome profound contemplation: whence we ſee alſo by experience in the ſound, that if they be raught into ſome imagination, they ſee not the things before them, nor heare though they be called, nor taſt meat ſauory or vnſauory, though they haue it in their mouth. Wherefore it is a thing certaine, that not the vnderſtanding or outward ſenſes, but the imagination, is that which maketh the iudgement, and taketh notice of particular things.

It followeth then, that the phiſition, who is well ſeen in Theoricke, for that he is indowed with great vnderſtanding

ſtanding, or great memorie, muſt of force prooue a bad practitioner, as hauing defect in his imagination. And contrariwiſe, he that prooueth a good practitioner, muſt of force be a bad Theoriſt: for much imagination cannot be vnited with much vnderſtanding and much memorie. And this is the cauſe for which ſo few are thoroughly ſeen in phiſicke, or commit but ſmall errors in curing: for, not to halt in the worke, it behoueth to know the art, and to poſſeſſe a good imagination, for putting the ſame in practiſe, and we haue prooued that theſe cannot ſtick togither.

The Phiſition neuer goeth to know and cure a diſeaſe, but that ſecretly to himſelfe he frameth a *Syllogiſme in Darij*, though he be neuer ſo well experienced, and the proofe of his firſt proportion belongeth to the vnderſtanding, and of the ſecond to the imagination: for which cauſe, the great Theoriſts doe ordinarily erre in the *minor*, and the great practitioners in the *maior*: as if we ſhould ſpeake after this maner, Euerie feuer which ſpringeth from cold and moiſt humours, ought to be cured wih medicins hot and drie. (Taking the tokening of the cauſe) this feuer which the man endureth, dependeth on humors cold and moiſt: therefore the ſame is to be cured with medicines hot and drie. The vnderſtanding will ſufficiently prooue the truth of the *maior*, becauſe it is an vniuerſall, ſaying; That cold & moiſt require for their temperature hot and drie: for euerie qualitie is abated by his contrarie. But comming to prooue the *minor*, there the vnderſtanding is of no value: for that the ſame is particular and of another iuriſdiction whoſe notice appertaineth to the imagination, borowing the proper and particular tokens of the diſeaſe, from the fiue outward ſenſes.

And if the tokening is to be taken from the feuer, or from his cauſe, the vnderſtanding cannot reach therunto: onely it teacheth the tokening is to be taken from that which ſheweth greateſt perill; but which of thoſe tokenings is greateſt, is only known to the imagination, by counting the damages which the feuer produceth, with thoſe of the *Syntones* of the euill, and the cauſe and the ſmall or much force of the power. To attain this notice, the imagination poſſeſſeth certain vnutterable properties, with which the ſame cleereth matters that cannot be expreſſed not conceiued, neither is there found any art to teach them. Where-through, we ſee a phiſition enter to viſit a patient, and by meanes of his ſight, his hearing, his ſmelling, and his feeling, he knoweth things which ſeem impoſſible. In ſort that if we demand of the ſame phiſition, how he could come by ſo readie a knowledge, himſelfe cannot tell the reaſon: for it is a grace which ſpringeth from the fruitfulneſſe of the imagination, which by another name is termed a readineſſe of capacitie, which by common ſignes, and by vncertain coniectures, and of ſmall importance, in the twinckling of an eie knoweth 1000 differẽces of things, wherein the force of curing and prognoſticating with certaintie conſiſteth.

This ſpice of promptneſſe, men of great vnderſtanding do want, for that it is a part of the imagination: for which cauſe, hauing the tokens before their eies (which giue them notice how the diſeaſe fareth) it worketh no maner alteration in their ſenſes, for that they want imagination. A phiſition once asked me in great ſecreſie, what the cauſe was, that he hauing ſtudied with much curioſitie all the rules and conſiderations of the art prognoſticatiue; & being therin throughly inſtructed, yet

yet could neuer hit the truth in any prognoſtication which he made. To whom (I remember) I yeelded this anſwer that the art of Phiſick is learned with one power, and put in execution with another. This man had a verie good vnderſtanding, but wanted imagination: but in this doctrine there ariſeth a difficulty very great, and that is, how phiſitions of great imagination, can learn the art of phiſicke, ſeeing they want that of vnderſtanding: and if it be true that ſuch were better than thoſe who were well learned, to what end ſerueth it to ſpend time in the ſchooles? to this may be anſwered, that firſt to know the art of phiſicke is a matter verie important: for in two or three yeares, a man may learn al that which the ancients haue bin getting in two or three thouſand. And if a man ſhould herein aſcertain himſelfe by experience, it were requiſit that he liued ſome thouſands of yeeres, and in experimenting of medicines, he ſhould kill an infinit number of perſons before he could attain to the knowledge of their qualities: from whence we are freed, by reading the books of reaſonable experienced phiſitions, who giue aduertiſment of that in writing, which they found out in the whole courſe of their liues; to the end that the phiſitions of theſe daies may miniſter ſome receits with aſſurance, and take heed of other-ſome as venomous.

Beſides this, we are to weet that the common & vulgar points of al arts are very plain and eaſie to learn, and yet the moſt important of the whole worke. And contrariwiſe, the moſt curious and ſubtile, are the moſt obſcure, and of leaſt neceſſitie for curing. And men of great imagination, are not altogither depriued of vnderſtanding, nor of memorie. Wher-through, by hauing theſe two powers in ſome meaſure they are able to learn the

moſt neceſſarie points of Phiſicke : for that they are plaineſt, and with the good imagination which they haue, can better looke into the diſeaſe and the cauſe thereof, than the cunningeſt doctors. Beſides that the imagination is it which findeth out the occaſion of the remedie that ought to be applied, in which grace the greateſt part of practiſe conſiſteth : for which cauſe *Galen* ſaid, that the proper name of a phiſition, was The finder out of occaſion.

Now to be able to know the place, the time, and the occaſion, for certain, is a worke of the imagination, ſince it toucheth figure and correſpondence; but the difficultie conſiſteth in knowing (amongſt ſo many differences as there are of the imagination) to which of them the practiſe of Phiſicke appertaineth, for it is certaine, that they all agree not in one ſelfe particular reaſon, which contemplation hath giuen me much more toile and labour of ſpirit than all the reſidue: and yet for all that, I cannot as yet yeeld the ſame a fitting name, vnleſſe it ſpring from a leſſe degree of heat which partaketh that difference of imagination, wherewith verſes and ſongs are endited. Nether do I relie altogether on this, for the reaſon whereon I ground my ſelfe, is, that ſuch as I haue marked to be good practitioners, do all piddle ſomwhat in the art of verſifieng, and raiſe not vp their contemplation very high, and their verſes are not of any rare excellencie, which may alſo betide, for that their heat exceedeth that tearme which is requiſit for poetrie: and if it ſo come to paſſe for this reaſon, the heat ought to hold ſuch qualitie, as it ſomewhat drie the ſubſtance of the braine, and yet much reſolue not the natural heat, albeit (if the ſame paſſe further) it breedeth no euill difference of the wit for Phiſicke: for it vniteth the vnderſtanding

derſtanding to the imagination by aduſtion. But the imagination is not ſo good for curing, as this which I ſeeke, which inuiteth a man to be a witch, ſuperſtitious, a magician, a deceiuer, a palmiſter, a fortune teller, and a calker: for the diſeaſes of men are ſo hidden, and deliuer their motions with ſo great ſecrecie, that it behooueth alwaies to go calking what the matter is.

This difference of imagination may hardly be found in Spaine, for tofore we haue prooued that the inhabitants of this region want memory and imagination, and haue good diſcourſe: neither yet the imaginatiō of ſuch as dwell towards the North, is of auaile in Phiſicke, for it is very ſlow and ſlacke, only the ſame is towardly to make clocks, pictures, poppets, & other ribaldries which are impertinent for mans ſeruice.

Ægypt alone is the region which ingendereth in his inhabitants this differēce of imagination, wherthrough the Hiſtoriens neuer make an end of telling, how great enchaunters the Aegyptians are, and how ready for obtaining things, and finding remedies to their neceſſities. *Ioſeph* to exaggerat the wiſedome of *Salomon*, ſayd in this manner, So great was the knowledge and wiſedome which *Salomon* receiued of God, that he outpaſſed al the ancients, and euen the very Egyptians, who were reputed the wiſeſt of all others. And *Plato* alſo ſayd, that the Aegyptians exeeeded all the men of the world in skill how to get their liuing; which abilitie appertaineth to the imagination. And that this is true, may plainly appeare, for that all the ſciences belonging to the imagination, were firſt deuiſed in Ægypt, as the Mathematicks, Aſtrologie, Arithmeticke, Perſpectiue, Iudiciarie, and the reſt. But the argument which moſt ouer-ruleth me in this behalfe, is, that whē *Francis* of *Valois* king of France,

was moleſted by a long infirmitie, and ſaw that the Phiſitions of his houſhold and court, could yeeld him no remedy, he would ſay euery time when his feuer increaſed, It was not poſſible that any Chriſtiã Phiſition could cure him, neither at their hands did he euer hope for recouerie: wherethrough one time agreeued to ſee himſelfe thus vexed with this feuer, he diſpatched a poſt into Spaine, praying the emperour *Charles* the fifth, that he would ſend him a Iew Phiſition, the beſt of his court, touching whom he had vnderſtood, that he was able to yeeld him remedie for his ſickneſſe, if by art it might be effected. At this requeſt the Spaniards made much game, and all of them concluded it was an humorous conceit of a man, whoſe brains were turmoiled with the feuer. But for all this, the Emperour gaue commandement that ſuch a Phiſition ſhould be ſought out, if anie there were, though to find him they ſhould be driuen to ſend out of his dominions; and whē none could be met withall, he ſent a Phiſition newly made a Chriſtian, ſuppoſing that he might ſerue to ſatisfie the kings humour. But the Phiſition being arriued in France, and brought to the kings preſence, there paſſed between them a gratious diſcourſe, in which it appeared that the Phiſition was a Chriſtian: and therefore the king would receiue no phiſicke at his hands. The king with opinion which he had conceiued of the phiſition, that he was an Hebrue, by way of paſſing the time, asked him whether he were not as yet weary in looking for the Meſſias promiſed in the law? The phiſition anſwered; Sir, I expect not any Meſſias promiſed in the Iews law. You are verie wiſe in that (replied the king): for the tokens which were deliuered in the diuine ſcripture, whereby to know his comming, are all fulfilled many daies ago.

This number of daies (reioyned the phiſition) we Chriſtians do well reckon: for there are now finiſhed 1542 yeares, that he came and conuerſed in the world: 33 yeares, in the end of which he died on the croſſe, and the third day roſe again, and afterwards aſcended into heauen, where he now remaineth. Why then quoth the king you are a Chriſtian? yea Sir, by the grace of God, I am a Chriſtian (quoth the phiſition) then (anſwered the king) return you home to your own dwelling in good time: for in mine owne houſe and court I haue Chriſtian phiſitions very excellent, and I held you for a Iew, who (in mine opinion) are thoſe that haue beſt naturall abilitie to cure my diſeaſe. After this maner he licenced him without once ſuffering him to feele his pulſe, or ſee his ſtate, or telling him one word of his griefe. And forthwith he ſent to Conſtantinople for a Iew, who healed him with the onely milke of a ſhe Aſſe.

This imagination of king *Francis* (as I think) was very true, and I haue ſo conceiued it to be, for that in the great hot diſtemperatures of the brain, I haue prooued tofore, how the imagination findeth out that, which (the partie being ſound) could neuer haue done. And becauſe it ſhall not ſeem that I haue ſpoken in ieſt, and without relying herein vpon a materiall ground; you ſhall vnderſtand that the varieties of men, aſwell in the compoſitions of the body, as of the wit and conditions of the ſoule, ſpring from their inhabiting countries of different temperature, from drinking diuers waters, and from not vſing all of them one kind of food. Wherein *Plato* ſaid, Some through variable windes and heats, are amongſt themſelues diuers in maner and kinds: others through the waters and food which ſpring of the earth,

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who not only in their bodies, but in their minds alſo can skill to do things better and woorſe, as if he ſhould ſay, ſome men are different from others, either by reaſon of the contrarie aire, or through drinking ſeuerall waters, or for that they feed not all vpon one kind of meat, and this difference is diſcerned not only in the countenaunce and demeanure of the body, but alſo in the wit of the ſoule.

If I then ſhall now proue, that the people of Iſraell dwelt many yeares in Ægypt, and that departing from thence, they did eat & drinke waters & meats, which are appropriat to make this difference of imagination, I ſhall therby yeeld a demonſtration for the opinion of the king of France, and by conſequence we ſhall vnderſtand what wits of men are in Spaine to be made choice of, for ſtudying the art of Phiſicke. As touching the firſt, we muſt know, that *Abraham* asking tokens whereby to be aſſured that he or his deſcendents ſhould poſſeſſe the land of promiſe, the text ſayth, that whileſt he ſlept, God made him anſwer ſaying, Know that thy ſeed ſhall bee a ſtranger in a country not his owne, and they ſhall make them vnderlings in bondage, and afflict them for 400 yeares, notwithſtanding I will iudge that nation whom they ſerue, and after this, they ſhall depart from thence with great ſubſtance, which Propheſie was accompliſhed: albeit God for certaine reſpects, added thereynto 30 yeares more, for which cauſe the ſcripture ſayth, But the aboad of the children of Iſraell in Ægypt was 430 yeares, which being finiſhed, that very day the whole armie of the Lord departed out of the land of Aegypt. But although this text ſay manifeſtly, that the people of Iſraell abode in Aegypt 400 yeares, a gloſſe declareth, that theſe yeares were the whole time which Iſraell went on

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pilgrimage, vntill he poſſeſſed his own countrie. In as much as he remained in Aegypt but 210 yeares, which declaration agreeth not well with that which S. *Stephen* the Protomartyr made, in his diſcourſe to the Iewes, namely that the people of Iſraell was 430 yeares in the bondage of Aegypt.

And albeit the abode of 210 yeares ſuffiſed, that the qualities of Aegypt might take hold in the people of Iſraell, yet the time whiles they liued abroad, was no loſt ſeaſon, in reſpect of that which appertaineth to the wit, for thoſe who liue in bondage, in miſerie, in affliction, and in ſtrange countries, engender much choler aduſt, becauſe they want libertie of ſpeech, and of reuenging their iniuries: and this humour, when the ſame is grown drie, becommeth the inſtrument of ſubtiltie, of craft, and of malice: whence we ſee by experience, that if a man take hell for bad manners and conditions, he cannot find worſe than in a ſlaue, whoſe imagination alwaies occupieth it ſelfe in deuiſing how to procure dammage to his maiſter, and freedome to himſelfe. Moreouer the land which the people of Iſraell walked through, was not much eſtranged nor different from the qualities of Aegypt: for in reſpect of the miſerie thereof, God promiſed *Abraham* to giue him another, much more aboundant and fruitfull. And this is a matter greatly verefied, as well in good naturall Philoſophie, as in experience, that barraine and beggerly regions, not fat, nor plentiful of fruit, engender men of very ſharpe wit. And contrariwiſe abundant and fertile ſoils, bring foorth perſons big limmed, couragious, and of great bodily forces, but very ſlow of wit.

Touching Greece, the Hiſtoriens neuer make an end to recount, how appropriat that region is to breed men of

of great habilitie, and particularly *Galen* auoucheth, that it is held a miracle for a man to find a foole in Athens, And we muſt note that this was a citie the moſt miſerable, and moſt barren of all the reſt in Greece. Whence we collect, that through the qualities of Egipt, and of the Prouinces where the Hebrue people liued, they grew very quick of capacitie. But it behoueth likewiſe to vnderſtand for what cauſe the temperature of Ægypt produceth this difference of imagination. And this wil fall out a plain matter when you are done to ware, that in this region, the ſunne yeeldeth a feruent heat: and therfore the inhabitants haue their brain dried, and choler aduſt, the inſtrument of wilineſſe and aptneſſe: In which ſenſe, *Ariſtotle* demandeth why the men of Aethiopia & Ægypt, haue their feet crooked, & are commonly curlpated and flat noſed? to which probleme he anſwereth, that the much heat of the country roſteth the ſubſtance of theſe members, and wrieth them, as it draweth togither a peece of leather ſet by the fire; and for the ſame cauſe, their haire curleth, and themſelues alſo are wily. And that ſuch as inhabit hot countries, are wiſer than thoſe who are born in cold regions, we haue alreadie prooued by the opinion of *Ariſtotle*: who demandeth whence it grows, that men are wiſer in hot climats than in cold? But he wiſt not to anſwer this probleme, nor make diſtinction of wiſdome: for we haue prooued heretofore, that in man there reſt two ſorts of wiſdome; one whereof *Plato* ſaid, Knowledge which is ſeuered from Iuſtice, ought rather to be termed craft than wiſdome: another there is found accompanied with iuſtice and ſimplicity, without doubleneſſe, and without wiles; and this is properly called Wiſdome: for it goeth alwaies guided by iuſtice and dutie. They who inhabit very

very hot countries, are wiſe in the firſt kind of wiſdome, and ſuch as are thoſe of Ægypt.

Now let vs ſee when the people of Iſraell was departed out of Ægypt, and come into the deſart, what meat they did eat, what water they dranke, and of what temperature the aire was where they trauelled? that we may know whether vpon this occaſion, the wit with which they iſſued out of bondage, took exchange; or whether the ſame were more confirmed in them? Fortie yeares (ſaith the text) God maintaind this people with Manna, a meat ſo delicat and ſauoury, as any might be, that euer men taſted in the world. In ſort that *Moſes* ſeeing the delicacie and goodneſſe therof, commanded his brother *Aaron* to fill a veſſell, and place the ſame in the Arke of confederacie, to the end the deſcendents of this people, when they were ſetled in the land of promiſe, might ſee the bread with which God had fed their fathers, whiles they liued in the wilderneſſe, and how bad paiment they yeelded him in exchange of ſuch cheriſhments. And to the end that we who haue not ſeen this meat, may know of what maner the ſame was: it will do well that we deſcribe the Manna which nature maketh; and ſo adioining therunto the conceit of a great delicacie, we may wholly imagine his goodneſſe. The materiall cauſe of which Manna is engendred, is a very delicat vapour, which the ſunne, with the force of his heat, draweth vp from the earth; the which taking ſtay aloft, is concocted and made perfect: and then the cold of the night cõming on, it congealeth, and through his waightineſſe, turneth to fall vpon the trees and ſtones, where men gather the ſame, and preſerue it in veſſels to ſerue for food. It is called Deawy, and Airy honny, through the reſemblance which it beareth to the deaw, and for

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that it is made in the aire. His colour is white, his ſauour ſweet as honny: his figure like that of Coriander, which ſignes the holy Scripture placeth alſo in the Manna, which the people of Iſrael did eat: and therfore I carry an imagination, that both were ſemblable in nature. But if that which God created were of more delicat ſubſtance, ſo much the better ſhall we confirme our opinion. But I am euer of opinion that God applied himſelf to naturall means, when with them he could performe what he meant; and where nature wanted, his omnipotencie ſupplied. This I ſay, becauſe to giue them Manna to eat in the deſart (beſides that which heerby he would ſignifie) me ſeemeth was founded in the ſelfe diſpoſition of the earth, which (euen at this day) produceth the beſt Manna in the world: through which *Galen* affirmeth, that on Mount Libanus (which is not far diſtant frō this place) there is great and very choice abundance: in ſort, that the countrie people are woont to ſing in their paſtimes, That *Iupiter* raineth honny in that region. And though it be true, that God miraculouſly created that Manna in ſuch quantitie, at ſuch time, and on ſpeciall daies: yet it may be that it partaked the ſame nature with ours, as had alſo the water which *Moſes* drew forth of the rocke; and the fire which *Elias* with his word cauſed to rain from heauen; all of them naturall things, though miraculouſly brought to paſſe.

The Manna deſcribed by the holy Scripture, it ſaith was as deaw, & as the ſeed of Coriander, white, & in taſt like honny, which conditions are alſo in the Manna produced by nature. The temperature of this meat, the Phiſitions ſay, is hot, and conſiſting of ſubtile and verie delicat parts, which compoſition the Manna eaten by the Iews, ſhould alſo ſeeme to haue: whereon (complaining

ning of his tenderneſſe) they ſaid in this maner, Our ſoule hath a ſulſomneſſe at this ſlight meat; as if they ſhould ſay, that they could no longer endure nor brook ſo light a meat in their ſtomacke: and the Philoſophie of this was, that their ſtomacks had been made ſtrong by onions, chibals, and leeks; and comming to eat a meat of ſo ſmall reſiſtance, it wholly with them turned into choler. And for this cauſe, *Galen* gaue the charge that men endowed with much naturall heat, ſhould forbeare to eat honny or other light meats: for they would turne to corruption, and in ſteed of digeſtion, would partch vp like ſoot.

The like heereof befell to the Hebrues, as touching Manna, which with them wholly turned into choler aduſt, and therefore they were altogither dry and thin: for this meat had no corpulencie to fatten them. Our ſoule (ſaid they) is drie, and our eies ſee nothing but Manna. The water which they dranke after this meat, was ſuch as they would deſire; and if they could not find any ſuch, God ſhewed to *Moſes* a wood of ſo diuine vertue, that dipping the ſame in groſſe and ſalt waters, it made them to become delicat and of good ſauor: and when they had no ſort of water at all, *Moſes* took the rod, with which he had parted the red Sea, and ſtriking therewith the rocks, there iſſued ſprings of waters ſo delicat and ſauoury, as their taſt could deſire. In ſort, that S. *Paul* ſaith, The rocke followed them, as if he ſhould ſay, The water of the rocke ſeconded their taſt, iſſuing delicat, ſweet, and ſauourie. And they had accuſtomed their ſtomacks before, to drinke waters thicke and briniſh: for in Aegypt (ſaith *Galen*) they boiled them ere they could ſerue for drinke, for that they were naughty and corrupt, ſo as afterwards drinking waters ſo delicat,

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it could not fall out otherwiſe, but that they ſhould turn into choler, for that they found ſmall reſiſtance. Water requireth the ſame qualities, to digeſt well in our ſtomacke (ſaith *Galen*) & not to corrupt, that the meat hath wheron we accuſtomably feed. If the ſtomack be ſtrong, it behoueth to giue the ſame ſtrong meat, which may anſwer in proportion: if the ſame be weake and delicat, ſuch alſo the meat ought to be. The like regard is to be held as touching the water: where-through we ſee by experience, that if a man vſe to drinke groſſe water; he neuer quencheth his thirſt with the purer: neither feeleth it in his ſtomacke. Rather the ſame encreaſeth his thirſt: for the exceſſiue heat of the ſtomacke burneth and reſolueth it ſo ſoon as it is receiued, becauſe therein is no reſiſtance.

The aire which they enioyed in the deſert, we may alſo ſay, that it was ſubtile and delicat: for iourneing ouer mountains, and through vninhabited places, they had the ſame alwaies freſh, clenſed, and without anie corruption: for they neuer made long ſtay in any one place. So did it alwaies carrie a temperature: for by day a cloud was ſet before the ſun, which ſuffered him not to ſcorch ouer vehemently; and by night, a piller of fire which moderated the ſame. And to enioy an aire of this maner (*Ariſtotle* affirmeth) doth much quicken the wit. We may conſider then that the men of this folke muſt needs haue a feed very delicat and aduſt, eating ſuch meat as Manna was, and drinking the waters aboue ſpecified, and breathing and enioying an aire ſo clenſed and pleaſant, as alſo that the Hebrue women bred flowers very ſubtile and delicat.

Againe, let vs call to mind, that which *Ariſtotle* ſaid, that the flowres being ſubtile and delicat, the child who

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is bred of them, ſhalbe a man of great capacitie. How much it importeth, that for begetting children of great ſufficiencie, the fathers do feed on delicat meats, we will prooue at large in the laſt chapter of this worke. And becauſe all the Hebrues did eat of one ſelfe ſo ſpirituall and delicat meat, and dranke of one ſelfe water, all their children and poſteritie prooued ſharp and great of wit in matters appertaining to this world.

Now then, when the people of Iſraell came into the land of promiſe, with ſo great a wit as we haue expreſſed, there befell vnto them afterwards ſo many trauails, dearths, ſiedges of enimies, ſubiections, bondages, and ill intreatings: that though they had not brought from Ægypt and the wilderneſſe, that temperature, hot, drie, and aduſt before ſpecified: they would yet haue made it ſo by this diſmall life: for continuall ſadneſſe and toil, vniteth the vitall ſpirits, and the arteriall blood, in the brain, in the liuer, and in the heart: and there ſtaying one aboue another, they grow to drineſſe and aduſtion. Where-through, oft times they procure the feuer, and their ordinary is to make melancholie by aduſtiō, wherof they (in maner) do all partake euen to this day, in reſpect of that (which *Hppocrates* ſaith) Feare and ſadneſſe continuing a long time, ſignifieth melancholie. This choler aduſt (we ſaid before) to be the inſtrument of promptneſſe, craftineſſe, ſharpneſſe, ſubtiltie, and maliciouſneſſe. And this is applied to the coniectures of Phiſicke, and by the ſame a man getteth notice of the diſeaſes, their cauſes and remedies. Wherfore king *Francis* vnderſtood this maruellous well, and it was no lightneſſe of the brain, or inuention of the diuell, which he vttered. But through his great feuer, laſting ſo manie dayes, and with the ſadneſſe to find himſelfe ſicke and

without remedy, his brain grew dry, and his imagination roſe to ſuch a point, of which we made proofe tofore, that if it haue the temperature behooffull, a man will on a ſodain deliuer that which he neuer learned. But there preſents it ſelfe a difficultie very great againſt all theſe things rehearſed by vs, and that is, that if the children or nephews of thoſe who were in Ægypt, and enioyed the Manna, the waters, and the ſubtle aire of the wilderneſſe, had been made choice of for phiſitions, it might ſeeme, that king *Francis* opinion were in ſome part probable, for the reaſons by vs reported. But that their poſteritie ſhould preſerue till our daies thoſe diſpoſitions of the Manna, the water, the aire, the afflictions, and the trauails, which their anceſtors endured in the priſon of Babilon, it is a matter hard to be conceiued: for if in 430 yeares, during which the people of Iſrael liued in Ægypt, and 40 in the deſart, their ſeed could purchaſe thoſe diſpoſitions of abilitie, better, and with more facilitie could they leeſe it again in 2000 yeares, whileſt they haue been abſent. And ſpecially ſithence their comming into Spain, a region ſo contrarie to Ægypt, and where they haue fed vpon different meats, and druncke waters of nothing ſo good temperature and ſubſtance as thoſe other.

This is agreeable to the nature of man, and whatſoother liuing creature and plant, which forthwith partaketh the conditions of the earth where they liue, and leeſe thoſe which they brought with thē from elſwhere. And whatſoeuer inſtance they can alleage, the like will betide it within few daies beyond all gainſaying.

Hippocrates recounteth of a certain ſort of men, who to be different from the vulgar, choſe for a token of their nobilitie, to haue their head like a ſugar-loafe: And to

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ſhape this figure by art, when the child was born, the mid wiues tooke care to bind their heads with ſweaths, and bands vntill they were faſhioned to the forme. And this artificialneſſe grew to ſuch force, as it was conuerted into nature: for in proceſſe of time, all the children that were born of nobilitie, had their head ſharp from their mothers womb. So from thenceforth, the art and diligence of the mid-wiues heerin, became ſuperfluous. But ſo ſoone as they left nature to her liberty, and her owne ordering, without oppreſſing her any longer with art, ſhe turned by little and little to recouer again the figure which ſhe had before.

In like ſort might it befall the children of Iſrael, who notwithſtanding the region of Ægypt, the Manna, the delicat waters, and their ſorrowfulneſſe, wrought thoſe diſpoſitions of wit in that ſeed: yet thoſe reaſons and reſpects ſurceaſing, and other contrary growing on, it is certain that by little and little the qualities of the Manna would haue worn away, and other far different therefrom haue grown on, conformable to the countrey where they inhabited, to the meats which they fed vpon, to the waters which they dranke, & to the aire which they breathed. This doubt in naturall philoſophy holdeth little difficultie: for there are ſome accidents to be found, which are brought in at a moment, & afterwards endure for euer in the ſubiect, without poſſibility of corrupting. Others there are, which waſt aſmuch time in vndoing, as they occupied in engrafting, & ſome more, ſome leſſe, according to the action of the agent, and the diſpoſition of the patient. For example of the firſt, we muſt know, That a certain man through a great feare whereinto he was driuen, reſted ſo transformed and changed in colour, that he ſeemed dead; and the ſame

laſted not only during all the time of this owne life, but alſo the children which he begat had the ſame colour: without that he could find any remedie to take it away. Conformable heerunto, it may be, that in 430 yeares, whileſt the people of Iſrael led their liues in Aegypt, 40 in the wilderneſſe, and 60 in the bondage of Babilon there needed more than 3000 yeares, that this ſeed of *Abraham* ſhould take a full loſſe of their diſpoſition of wit, occaſioned by this Manna, ſeeing to reforme the bad colour, ſetled vpon a ſodain through feare, more than 100 yeares were requiſit. But becauſe the truth of this doctrin may be vnderſtood from the root, it behoueth to reſolue two doubts which ſerue to the purpoſe, and as yet I haue not cleered. The firſt is, whence it commeth, that meats, by how much the more delicat and ſauoury they are, as hennes, and partridge; ſo much the ſooner the ſtomacke doth abhorre and lothe them? and contrariwiſe, we ſee that a man eateth beefe all the yeare long without receiuing any annnoiance thereby; and if he eat hennes fleſh but three or foure daies togither, the fifth he cannot abide the ſauour thereof; but that it will turne his ſtomacke vpſide-downe. The ſecond is, whence it commeth, that bread of wheat, and fleſh of mutton, not being of ſubſtance ſo good and ſauoury, as hen and partridge; yet the ſtomacke neuer loatheth them, though we feed theron all our liues long? But wanting bread we cannot eat other meats, neither do they content vs.

He that can ſhape an anſwer to theſe two doubts, ſhal eaſily vnderſtand for what cauſe the deſcendents of the people of Iſraell, haue not yet loſt the diſpoſitions & accidents which Manna brought into that ſeed: neither will the promptheſſe of wit, and ſubtletie whereof they

then poſſeſſed themſelues, ſo ſoon take an end. Two certain and very true principles there are in naturall philoſophy, on which the anſwer and reſolution of theſe doubts dependeth. The firſt is, That al powers, (whatſoeuer) which gouern man, are naked and depriued of the conditions and qualities which reſt in their obiect, to the end that they may know and giue iudgement of all the differences. The eies partake this property, who being to receiue into themſelues all figures and colours, it was of neceſſitie, vtterly to depriue them of figures and colours. For if they were pale, as in thoſe who are ouercome with the yellow iandize, all things wheron they looked would appeare to them of the ſame colour. So the tongue, which is the inſtrument of taſt, ought to be void of all ſauours: and if the ſame be ſweet or bitter, we know by experience, that whatſoeuer we eat or drinke hath the like taſt. And the ſame may be auouched of hearing, of ſmelling, and of feeling: The ſecond principle is, that all things created, naturally couet their preſeruation, and labour to endure for euer, and that the being which God and nature haue giuen them, may neuer take end: notwithſtanding that afterward they are to poſſeſſe a better nature. By this principle, all naturall things endowed with knowledge and ſenſe, abhorre and flie from that which altereth and corrupteth their naturall compoſition.

The ſtomacke is naked and depriued of the ſubſtance and qualities of all meats in the world, as the eye is of colours and figures, and when we eat ought, though the ſtomacke ouercome it, yet the meat turneth againſt the ſtomacke, for that the ſame is of a contrary principle, and altereth and corrupteth his temperature and ſubſtance, for no agent is of ſuch force, but that in doing, it

alſo ſuffereth. Meats that are very delicat and pleaſing doe much alter the ſtomacke; firſt, becauſe it digeſteth and embraceth them with great appetit and liking, and then, through their being ſo ſuttle and void of excrements, they pierce into the ſubſtance of the ſtomacke, from whence they cannot depart againe: the ſtomacke then feeling that this meat altereth his nature, and taketh away the proportion which he carrieth to other meats, groweth to abhor the ſame, and if he muſt needs feed thereon, it behoooueth to vſe many ſallets and ſeaſonings, thereby to beguile him.

All this, Manna had euen from the beginning, for though the ſame were a meat of ſuch delicaſie and pleaſing reliſh, yet in the end, the people of Iſraell found it fulſome, and therefore ſayd, Our ſoule loatheth this ouer light meat. A complaint far vnworthie of a people ſo ſpecially fauoured by God, who had pretended a remedie in that behalfe, which was, that Manna had thoſe reliſhes and taſts which well agreed with them, to the end they might eat thereof. Thou ſenteſt them bread from heauen, which had in it all pleaſingneſſe; for which cauſe many amongſt them fed theron with good appetite, for they had their bones, their ſinewes, and their fleſh, ſo imbewed with Manna and his qualities, that by means of the reſemblance from each to other, they longed after nothing elſe. The like befalleth in bread of wheat, and weathers fleſh, whereon we accuſtomably feed.

Groſſe meats and of good ſubſtance, as beefe, haue much excrements, and the ſtomacke receiueth them not with ſuch deſire, as thoſe that are delicat and of good reliſh, and therefore is longer ere the ſame take alteration by them. Hence commeth it, that to corrupt the alterati-

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on which Manna made in one day, it behoooueth to feed a whole moneth vpon contrarie meats: And (after this reckoning) to deface the qualities that Manna brought into the ſeed in the ſpace of 40 yeares, there need 4000 and vpward. And if any man will not herewith reſt ſatiſfied, let vs ſay, that as God brought out of Aegypt the 12 tribes of Iſraell, ſo he had taken then 12 male, and 12 female Moores of *Aethiopia*, and had placed them in our countrie, in how many yeares thinke we, would theſe Moores and this poſteritie, linger to leaue their natiue colour, not mixing themſelues the while with white perſons? to me it ſeemeth a long ſpace of yeares would be requiſit. For though 200 yeares haue paſſed ouer our heads, ſithens the firſt Aegyptians came out of Aegypt into Spaine, yet their poſteritie haue not forlorne that their delicacy of wit and promptneſſe, nor yet that roſted colour which their aunceſtors brought with them from Aegypt. Such is the force of mans ſeed when it receiueth thereinto any well rooted qualitie. And as in Spaine the Moores communicat the colour of their elders, by means of their ſeed, though they be out of Aethiopia, ſo alſo the people of Iſrael comming frō thence, may communicat to their deſcendents their ſharpeneſſe of wit, without remaining in Aegypt, or eating Manna: for to be ignorant or wiſe, is as well an accident in man, as to be blacke or white. True it is, that they are not now ſo quicke and prompt, as they were a thouſand yeares ſince: for from the time that they left to eat Manna, their poſterity haue euer leſſened hitherto, becauſe they vſed contrarie meats, and inhabited countries different from Aegypt: neither dranke waters of ſuch delicacie as in the wilderneſſe. As alſo by mingling with thoſe who deſcended from the Gentils, who wanted this difference

of wit: but that which cannot be denied them, is, that as yet they haue not loſt it altogither.

CHAP. XIII.

By what meanes it may be ſhewed, to what difference of abilitie the art of warfare appertaineth, and by what ſignes the man may be knowen, who is endowed with this maner of wit.

WHat is the cauſe (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) that ſeeing Fortitude is not the greateſt of all vertues, but Iuſtice and Prudence are greater than it: yet the commonwealth, and in a maner all men with a common conſent do make greater accompt, and within themſelues, do more honour a valiant man than either the iuſt or wiſe; though placed in neuer ſo high callings or offices. To this probleme *Ariſtotle* anſwereth, ſaying; there is no king in the world who doth not either make war, or maintain war againſt ſome other; and for ſomuch as the valiant procure them glorie and empire, take reuenge on their enemies, and preſerue their eſtate, they yeeld chiefeſt honour, nor to the principall vertue, which is Iuſtice, but to that by which they reap moſt profit and aduantage. For if they did not in this wiſe intreat the valiant, how were it poſſible, that kings ſhould find captains and ſouldiours, who would willingly ieopard their liues to defend their goods and eſtates?

Of the Aſiaticans it is recounted, that there was a people inhabiting a part thereof, who bare themſelues verie couragiouſly; and being asked why they had neither king nor law: they made anſwer, that laws made men

men cowards, and ſeeing it was neceſſarie to vndergoe the hazard of the wars, for depriuing another of his eſtate, they made choice to fight for their own behoofe, and themſelues to reap the benefit of the victorie. But this was an anſwer rather of barbarous men than reaſonable people, who well know, that without a king, without a common-wealth, and without lawes, it is impoſſible to preſerue men in peace. That which *Ariſtotle* ſaid, ſerueth very well to the purpoſe, though there be a better anſwer to be framed, namely, That when Rome honoured her captains with thoſe triumphs and ſolemnities, ſhe did not only reward the courage of the triumpher, but alſo the iuſtice with which he maintained his armie in peace and concord, the wiſdome with which he performed his enterpriſes, and their temperancy vſed in abſtaining from wine, women, and meat, which trouble the iudgement, and turne counſels into error. Yea wiſdome is more highly to be regarded and rewarded in a generall, than courage and manlineſſe: for as *Vegetius* well ſaid, Few ouer-couragious captains bring their enterpriſes to luckie paſſe. Which groweth for that wiſdome is more neceſſarie in warre, than courage in bickering: but *Vegetius* could neuer attain to the notice what maner of wiſdom this is: neither could plot down, with what difference of wit he ought to be endowed, who taketh charge in war. Neither do I ought maruell thereat: for the maner of philoſophie wheron this dependeth, was not then deuiſed. True it is, that to verefie this point, anſwereth not our firſt intent, which purporteth to make choice of apt wits for learning. But martiall affaires are ſo dangerous, and of ſo deep counſell: and it falleth out a matter ſo important for a king to know well vnto whom he credit his power and ſtate, that we

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ſhall perform no leſſe thanks-worthie a part of ſeruice to the common wealth, to teach this difference of wit and his ſigns, than in the other which we haue already deſcribed. For which cauſe we muſt note, that *Malitia* and *Militia*, *vz*. martial matters, and malice, haue as it were one ſelfe name, and likewiſe one ſelfe definition. For changing *a* into *i*, of *malitia* you make *militia*, and of *militia*, *malitia*, with great facilitie. What the nature and propertie of malice is, *Cicero* teacheth, ſaieng, Malice is a way of hurting, craftie, and full of guile. In warre (likewiſe) nothing falleth ſo much into cõſideration, as how to offend the enimie, and defend our ſelues from his entrappings. Therefore the beſt property whereof a Generall can be poſſeſſed, is to be malicious with his enemie, and neuer to conſtrue any his demeanures to a good ſenſe, but to the worſt that may be, and to ſtand on his guard.

Beleeue not (ſayth *Eccleſiaſticus*) thine enemie, with his lips he ſweetneth, and in his heart he betraieth thee, to make thee fall into the dike: he weepeth with his eies, and if he light vpon a fit occaſion, he will not be ſatiſfied with thy blood. Hereof we find a manifeſt example of the holy ſcripture: for the people of Iſrael being beſieged in Bethulia, and ſtraightned with hunger and thirſt, that famous lady *Iudith*, iſſued out with a reſolution to kill *Holofernes*, and going towards the armie of the Aſſirians, ſhe was taken by the ſentinels and guards, and being asked whether ſhe was bound, made anſwere with a two-fold mind; I am a daughter of the Hebrues, whom you hold beſieged, and flie vnto you, for I haue learned that they ſhall fall into your hands, and that you ſhall euill intreat them, becauſe they would not yeeld themſelues to your mercy: therefore I determined to flie vn-

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to *Holofernes*, and to diſcouer vnto him the ſecrets of this obſtinat people, ſhewing him how he may enter without the loſſe of any one ſouldier.

So *Iudith* being brought to *Holofernes* preſence, threw her ſelfe downe to the ground, and with cloſed hands began to worſhip him and vtter words full of deceit, the moſt craftily that might be, in ſort that *Holofernes* and all his counſell, verely beleeued ſhe ſayd nothing but truth: but ſhe not forgetfull what in heart ſhe had purpoſed, found a conuenient occaſion, and chopped off his head.

Contrary hereunto are the conditions of a friend, and therefore it behoooueth euer to yeeld him credit, wherethrough *Holofernes* ſhould haue done better to beleeue *Achior*, ſeeing he was his friend, and ōn zeale that he ſhould not leaue the ſiege with diſhonour, ſayd vnto him, Sir, firſt informe your ſelfe whether this people haue ſinned againſt God, for if it be ſo, himſelfe will deliuer them into your hands, without that you ſhall need to conquer them; but if he hold them in grace, know for certaine, that he will defend them, and we ſhall not be able to vanquiſh them. *Holofernes* conceiued diſpleaſure at this aduertiſement, as a man confident, laſciuious and a wine-bibber, which three things turne topſie turuie that counſell which is requiſit for the art of war. For which cauſe *Plato* ſayd, he liked very well of a law which the Carthagineans had, by which they commaunded, that the Generall whilſt he had charge of the armie, ſhould drinke no wine, for this licour (as *Ariſtotle* affirmeth) maketh a man of wit be quite burned vp with choler (as *Holofernes* ſhewed in thoſe ſo furious words which he ſpake to *Achior*.)

Now that wit which is requiſit for ambuſhes and ſtratagems,

tagems, aſwell to prepare them as to perceiue them, and to find out ſuch remedie as appertaineth, *Cicero* deſcribeth, drawing his deſcēt from this nown *verſutia*, which he ſaith is deriued from this verb *verſor* : for thoſe who are winding, craftie, double, and cauillers, vpon a ſodain contriue their wiles, and employ their conceit with facilitie: and ſo the ſame *Cicero* exemplified it, ſaying; *Chriſippus* a man doubtleſſe winding and craftie. I call thoſe winding whoſe mind is ſodainly winded about. This propertie to attain ſodainly the means is *ſolertia* (quickneſſe) and appertaineth to the imagination : for the powers which conſiſt in heat performe ſpeedily their worke. And for this cauſe men of great vnderſtanding are little worth for the war, for this power is very ſlow in his operation and a friend of vprightneſſe, of plainneſſe, of ſimplicitie and mercie: all which is woont to breed much dammage in war. Theſe are good to treat with friends, with whom the wiſdome of the imagination is not needfull; but only the rightfulneſſe and ſingleneſſe of the vnderſtanding, which admitteth no doubleneſſe, nor doth any wrong: therefore with the enemy it booteth nothing; for he alwaies ſtudieth to offend with wiles, and ſuch wit is requiſit wherwith to counter-gard our ſelues. And ſo Chriſt our redeemer aduiſed his diſciples, ſaying; Behold I ſend you as ſheepe amongſt woolfes: be you therefore wiſe as ſerpents, and ſimple as dooues. With our enimies we muſt practiſe wiſdome, and with our friends plainneſſe and ſimplicitie.

Now if the captain be not to giue credit to his enimy, but is alwaies to miſdoubt that he will go beyond him, it is neceſſarie that he hold a difference of imagination, forecaſtfull, warie, and which can skill to diſcern the wiles

wiles which come vailed with anie couerture : for the ſelfe power which finds them out can only deuiſe the remedies which are behooffull in that behalfe : that ſeemeth to be another difference of the imagination which deuiſeth the engins and war-like inſtruments, whereby vnuincible fortreſſes are won, which pitcheth the camp and marſhalleth euery ſquadron in his due place, and which knoweth the occaſions of ioyning and retiring; which plotteth treaties, conſortments and capitulations with the enemie : for all which the vnderſtanding is impertinent as are the eares to ſee withall. And therefore I nothing doubt, but that the art of war appertaineth to the imagination, for all whatſoeuer a good captain is to performe importeth conſonance, figure and correſpondence.

Now the difficulty reſteth to ſet down with what difference of the imagination in particular, war is to be mannaged. And in this I cannot reſolue with certaintie, becauſe the knowing therof is very nice : yet I coniecture that it requireth a degree more of heat than the practiſe of phiſicke, and that it allay choler but not vtterlie quench it.

This is very manifeſt : for thoſe captains who are full of promptneſſe and ſubtletie, are not verie couragious, nor deſirous of bickering, neither couet to come to handyſtrokes; but by ſtratagems & fetches, without aduenturing a broken pate, do bring their purpoſes to paſſe. Which property, better pleaſed *Vegetius* than any other. Good captains (ſaith he) not by open war, in which the perill is common, but by ſecret practiſes, euer aſſay with the ſafetie of their owne ſouldeirs, to cut their enemies in peeces, or at leaſt to make them afraid. The fruit of this manor of wit, the Romain Senat very wiſely looked

mostly into :

into: for though they had manie famous captains, who atchieued ſundry warres, yet returning to Rome to receiue the triumph and glorie due to their enterpriſe, ſo great were the plaints which the parents made for their children, the children for the parents, the wiues for their husbands, and brothers for brethren, that through the ſorrow for them who periſhed in the warres, they could take little pleaſure in the ſports and paſtimes. Wherfore the Senat took a reſolution, not to ſeeke out ſo couragious captains, wholly deſirous to come to hand ſtrokes: but men ſomwhat timorous, & very ready, as *Q. Fabius*, of whom it is written, that it was a wonder to ſee him offer a pitched battaile in the open field, and ſpeciallie when he was far from Rome, wherby in ill ſucceſſes he could not readily be releeued, and he did nought-els but giue way to the enemie, and deuiſe ſtratagems and wiles, with which he exploited great enterpriſes and obtained many victories, without the loſſe of any one ſouldiour. He was receiued into Rome with great ioy of all men: for if he carried forth 100000 ſouldiours, he returned with as many, vnleſſe ſome perhaps miſcarried by ſickneſſe. The ſhout which the people gaue at his returne was (as *Ennius* reporteth) of this tenour:

One man by lingring, only vs releeu'd.

As if they had ſaid, This man with giuing way to our enemies, hath made vs lords of the world, and brought backe our ſouldiours to their houſes in ſafetie. Some captains haue ſince that time endeuoured to imitate him: but becauſe they wanted his wit and readineſſe, they ſundry times let ſlip many fit occaſions of fighting, whence greater dammages and inconueniences aroſe, than if they had ſpeedily ioyned battaile. We may alſo take example of that famous Carthaginian captain, of whom

whom *Plutarch* writeth theſe words, *Annibal* after he had attained this ſo great a victorie, commanded that manie Italian priſoners ſhould freely be ſet at libertie without ranſom, to the end the fame of his courteſie and pardoning might be diſperſed among the people; albeit of diſpoſition he were very wide from this vertue: for of his owne nature he was fell and vnmercifull, and in ſuch ſort was trained vp from the tender yeares of his youth, that he neuer learned laws or ciuil conditions, but wars, ſlaughters, and betrayings of the enemy. Wher-through he grew to be a captain very cruell, and malicious in beguiling men, and alwaies deuiſing how he might entrap his enemie. And when he ſaw he could not preuaile by open war, he ſought to get the vpper hand by pollicies, as was plainly ſeen in this deed of arms by vs rehearſed, and by the battaile which he found againſt *Sempronius*, neer the riuer *Trebia*. The tokens to know a man that is poſſeſſed of this difference of wit, are very ſtrange and well worthy of contemplation. Wher-through *Plato* ſaith, that the man who is verie wiſe (in this ſort of abilitie which we trace out) cannot be couragious nor well conditioned: for *Ariſtotle* ſaith, That wiſdom conſiſteth in cold, and ſtomacke and manlineſſe in heat. Therfore theſe two qualities being repugnant and contrarie, it is impoſſible that a man be very full of hardineſſe, and alſo of wiſdome therewithall. For which cauſe it is neceſſarie that choler be burned, and become choler aduſt, to the end that a man may prooue wiſe: but where this ſpice of melancholie is found, inaſmuch as the ſame is cold, feare and cowardize are ſtraightwaies entertained. In ſort, that craft and readineſſe require heat, for that the ſame is a worke of the imagination, but not in ſuch degree as courage, where-through they repugne ech to o-

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ther in extenſion. But herein befalleth a matter worth the noting, that of the foure morall vertues, Iuſtice, Prudence, Fortitude, and Temperance; the two firſt require a wit and good temperature, to the end that they may be put in practiſe: for if a Iudge be not endowed with vnderſtanding, to make himſelfe capable of the point of iuſtice, little auails it that he carrie a good will to render euery man his due. Since this his good meaning may wander out of the way, and wrong the true proprietarie. The like is to be vnderſtood of wiſdome: for if the only will ſufficed to ſet things in good order, then in no work good or euill, ſhould any error be committed. There is no theefe whatſoeuer, who ſeeketh not to rob in ſuch manner as he may not be eſpied, and there is no captain, who deſireth not to be owner of ſo much wiſdome, as may ſerue to vanquiſh his enemie. But a theefe that is not his craftſmaiſter in filching, ſoon falleth to be diſcouered; and the captain that wanteth imagination, ere long is ouercome. Fortitude, and Temperance are two vertues, which men carrie in their fiſt, though they want a naturall diſpoſition: for if a man be diſpoſed to ſet little of his life, and ſhow hardineſſe, he may well do it: but if he be couragious of his owne naturall diſpoſition, *Ariſtotle* and *Plato* affirme verie truely, it is not poſſible that he can be wiſe though he would. In ſort, that by this reaſon, there groweth no repugnancie to vnite the wiſdome of the minde with courage: for a wiſe and skilful man, hath the vnderſtanding to hazard his honour in reſpect of his ſoule, and his life in reſpect of his honour, and his goods in reſpect of his life, and ſo he doth. Hence it comes, that gentlemen for that they are ſo much honored, are ſo couragious; and there is none who will endure more hardneſſe in the wars, for

that

that they are brought vp in ſo many pleaſures, to the end they may not be termed ribalds. Heeron is that by-word grounded, God keepe me from a Gent. by day, and a theefe by night; for the one, becauſe he is ſeene, and the other that he may not be known, do fight with double reſolution: on this ſelfe reaſon, is the religion of *Malta* grounded, who knowing how much it importeth nobilitie, to be a man of valure, haue a firme law, that all thoſe of their order ſhalbe iſſued from gentilitie, both on the fathers ſide and the mothers: for ſo ech of them muſt in the combat ſhew himſelfe worth two of a baſer progenie. But if a gentleman had the charge giuen him, to encamp an army, and the order whereby he ſhould put the enemy in rout, if he had not a wit appropriat hereunto, he would commit and vtter a thouſand diſorders: for wiſdome lieth not in mens diſpoſition. But if there were recõmended vnto him the guard of a gate: they might ſoundly ſleep on his eies, although by nature he were a baggage. The ſentence of *Plato* is to be conſtrued, when a wiſe man followeth his owne naturall inclination, and doth not correct the ſame by reaſon. And in that ſort it is true, that a verie wiſe man cannot of his naturall diſpoſition be couragious: for choler adduſt (which maketh him wiſe) maketh him alſo, ſaith *Hipparates*, timorous and fearfull. The ſecond propertie, wherewith a man poſſeſſed of this difference of wit cannot be endowed, is to be pleaſant and of quaint behauiour: for with his imagination he frameth many plots, and weeteth that whatſoeuer error or negligẽce, are the way to caſt away an army, wherthrough he euer carrieth an eie to the maine chance. But people of little worth, call carefulneſſe a toil, chaſtiſment crueltie, and mercie ſoftneſſe, ſuffering and diſſembling of leud parts a good

diſpoſition. And this verily ſpringeth, becauſe men are ſots, who pierce not into the true value of things, nor in what ſort they ought to be managed: but the wiſe and skilfull cannot hold patience, nor beare to ſee matters ill handled, though they nothing appertain vnto themſelues, and therfore liue a ſmall while, and with much trouble of ſpirit. Whence *Salomon* ſaid, I gaue alſo my mind to vnderſtand wiſdom, doctrine, errors, and folly; and found that in theſe alſo, there is wearineſſe and affliction of ſpirit: for into much wiſdome entreth much diſpleaſure, and who ſo attaineth Science, getteth ſorrow. In which words it ſeemeth that *Salomon* gaue vs to vnderſtand, that he liued better contented being ignorant, than after he had receiued wiſdome. And ſo verily it came to paſſe: for the ignorant liue moſt carelesſe, inaſmuch as nothing giueth them pain and vexation, and they little reck who haue a better capeaſe than themſelues. The vulgar accuſtometh to call ſuch the Angels of heauen: for they ſee how they take nothing at heart, neither find fault with anything ill done, but let all paſſe: but if they conſidered the wiſdome and condition of the Angels, they ſhould ſee it were a word that carried euill conſonance, and a caſe for the inquiſition houſe: for from the day when we receiue the vſe of reaſon, vntill that of our death, they doe nought els ſaue reprooue vs for all our euill doings, and aduiſe vs to that which we ought to do. And if as they ſpeake to vs in their ſpirituall language, by mouing our imagination, ſo they ſhould deliuer vs their opinion in materiall words, we would hold them importunate and vnmannerly brought vp. And he that beleeueth not this, let him marke that the Angel (of whom S. *Mathew* maketh mention) ſeemed ſuch a one to *Herod*, and to the wife of his

brother *Philip*, ſeeing (becauſe they would not heare his fault-findings) they taire and wel chopped off his head. Better were it, that theſe men, who by the vulgar are fondly termed Angels of heauen, were called Aſſes of the earth: for amongſt brute beaſts (ſaith *Galen*) there is none more blunt, or of leſſe wit than the Aſſe: although in memory he out-reach all the reſt. He refuſeth no burden, he goeth whither he is driuen without any gainſtriuing, he winceth not, he biteth not, he is not fugitiue, not iadiſh conditioned; if he be laboured with a cudgell, he ſetteth not by it, he is wholly made to the wel-liking and ſeruice of him that is to vſe him: theſe ſelfe properties do thoſe men partake, whom the vulgar terme Angels of heauen, which ſport-making, ſpringeth in them, for that they are blockheads and void of imagination; and haue their wrathfull power verie remiſſe, which tokeneth a great defect in a man, and argueth that he is ill compounded.

There was neuer Angel nor man in the world, better conditioned than Chriſt our redeemer, and he entring one day into the temple, belabored welfauoredly thoſe whom he found there ſelling of marchandize: and this he did becauſe the iraſcible is the chaſtice geuer, and ſword of reaſon, & the man who reproueth not things ill done, either ſheweth himſelfe but a foole, or is depriued of the wrathfull power. In ſort, that it falles out a miracle to ſee a wiſe man of that gentleneſſe or conditions, which are beſt liking to lewd mens fancies: whereſhrough ſuch as ſet down in writing the actions of *Iulius Cæſar*, maruelled to ſee how his ſouldiers could ſupport a man ſo rough and ſeuere, and this grew in him, becauſe he lighted vpon a wit requiſit for the warres. The third propriety of thoſe who are endowed with this difference

of wit is, to be reckleſſe touching the attiring of their perſon, and in a maner all of them are ſlouinly, homely, with their hoſen hanging about their heels, ful of wrinckles, their cap ſitting vpō the one ſide, with ſome threed-bare gabberdine on their backe, & neuer long to change ſuits.

This propertie, *Lucius Florus* recounteth, had that famous captain *Viriatus*, by nation a Portuguiſe, of whom (exaggerating his great humility) he ſaith and affirmeth, that he deſpiſed ſo much all ornament of his perſon, as there was no priuate ſouldier in his army, that wēt worſe apparelled than himſelfe. And verily this was no vertue, neither did he the ſame artificially, but it is a naturall effect of thoſe, who are poſſeſſed with that difference of imagination after which we enquire.

This rechleſneſſe in *Iulius Cæſar*, greatly deceiued *Cicero*: for being asked (after the battell) the cauſe which mooued him to follow the party of *Pompey*, he anſwered (as *Macrobius* recounteth) His girding deceiued me as if he had ſaid, It was my beholding of *Iulius Cæſar* to be a man ſomwhat ſlouinly, and who neuer wore his girdle handſomly, whom his ſouldiers in ſcoffe called, Looſe-coat. But this ſhould haue mooued and made him to know, that he was endowed with a wit requiſit to the counſell of warre. Rightly did *Silla* hit the naile on the head, who (as *Suetonius Tranquillius* reporteth) ſeeing the rechleſneſſe of *Iulius Cæſar* in his apparrelling himſelfe when he was a boy, aduertiſed the Romains, ſaying, take heed of this ill girded yong fellow. The Hiſtorians buſie themſelues much, in recounting how careleſſie *Hannibal* bare him touching his apparell, and how little he reaked to go neat and handſome. To grow in great diſlike at moſes on the cape, to take much care that his

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beardings fit cleane, and his cloke handsome, without plaits, appertaineth to a difference of the imagination of very base alloy, and gainsaith the vnderstanding, and that imagination which the war requireth. The fourth signe is to haue a bald head, and the reason heereof may soon be learned: for this difference of imagination, residеth in the forepart of the head, as doe all the rest, and excessiue heat burneth the skin of the head, and closeth the poures, through which the haire is to passe. Besides that the matter whereof the haire is engendered (as the Philitions auouch) are those excrements, which the brain expelleth in time of his nourishing, and by the great fire that there is, they are consumed and burned vp, and so the matter faileth whereof they may breed. And if *Iulius Cæsar* had been seen in this point of Philosophy, he would not so much haue shamed at his baldhead, as that to couer the same, he caused the hinder part of his haire which should hang downe on his necke, to be featly turned towards his forehead. And *Suetonius* maketh mention, that nothing so much contented him, as when the Senate enacted that he might weare a laurell garland on his head, and that on none other ground than because thereby he might couer his baldnesse. Another sort of baldnesse groweth from hauing the haire hard & earthy, and of a grosse composition, but that betokeneth a man void of vnderstanding, imagination and memory. The fifth signe, whereby those are known who haue this difference of imagination is, that such are spare in words and full of sentences, and the reason importeth because the braine being hard, it followeth of necessitie, that they suffer a defect in memorie, to which copie of words appertaineth. To find out the reason why a coward, springeth from a cold complexion, which the memorie maketh with the imagination,

gination, in his firſt degree of heat. Such as haue this conioyning of both powers, are ordinarily great liers, and neuer want words and tales, though you ſtand harkening vnto them a whole day together.

The ſixt propertie of thoſe who haue this difference of imagination, is, to be honeſt, and to take great diſlike at filthie and baudy talke: and therefore *Cicero* ſaith, that men very reaſonable, do imitate the honeſtie of nature, who hath hidden the vnſeemly and ſhamefull parts, which ſhe made to prouide for the neceſſity of mankind, and not to adorne it; and the conſequence is not to faſten the eyes on theſe, nor that the eares ſhould offend to heare them named. This we might well attribute to the imagination, and ſay that the ſame reaſon offended at the euill repreſentation of theſe parts; but in the laſt chapter we rendered a reaſon of this effect, and reduced the ſame to the vnderſtanding, and we adiudged him defectiue in this power, who tooke not offenſe at ſuch diſhoneſtie. And becauſe to the difference of imagination appurtenant to the art militaritie, there is ioyned this diſcourſe, therefore are good captains very honeſt. Wherthrough in the hiſtorie of *Iulius Cæſar*, we find an action of the greateſt honeſtie that might be, and that is, while they murthered him with daggers in the Senat-houſe, he (perceiuing it was impoſſible to eſcape death) gaue himſelfe to fall to the ground, and ſo fitted his imperiall robe about him, that after his death they found him couched with great honeſtie, with his legs and other parts couered, that might any way offend the ſight.

The ſeuenth propertie, and of great importance is, that the Generall haue good fortune and be luckie, by which ſigne we ſhall perfectly find, that he is ſeized of the wit and habilitie behooffull for that mortall, for in

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ſubſtance and truth, there is nothing which ordinarily maketh men vnfortunate, and that their enterprises do not alwaies take ſucceſſe after their deſire, ſaue that they are depriued of wiſedome, and lay not hold on the conuenient meanes for atchieuing their exploits. For that *Iulius Cæſar* ſhewed ſuch wiſedome in the affairs which he managed, he bare away the bell (in reſpect of fortunate ſucceſſe) from all other captaines of the world, ſo as in perils of importance, he encouraged his ſouldiors, ſaying, Feare not, ſolye our haue Cæſar and good fortune to fight on your partie. And whereas the Stoicks hold opinion, that as there was a firſt cauſe in erecting almighty God of infinit wiſedome, and ſtill by the order and concord of his marueilous workes, ſo alſo there was another vnwiſe and vnconſidered, whoſe workes proceed without order, without reaſon, and void of direction, for with an affection no way reaſonable, diſguiſh and reaueth from men riches, dignities, and honours. This they termed Fortune, ſeeing hir attend to men who performe their buſineſſe by hap hazard, without forecaſting, without wiſedome, and without ſubmitting themſelues to the gouernment of reaſon. They pourtraied her (the better to make her manners and malice known) in fourme of a woman, a roiall ſceptre in her hand, her eyes vailed, her feet vpon a round ball, accompanied with perſons fortish and void of all rules of liuing. By painting her like a woman, they noted her great lightneſſe and little diſcretion, by her roiall ſceptre, they acknowledged her ſoueraignty ouer riches and honour, her veiled eyes, gaue to vnderſtand the ill faſhion which ſhe held in diſtributing her gifts, her feet ſtanding on the round ball, betokened the ſmall firmeneſſe in the fauours which ſhe imparted, for ſhe matcheth

cheſt them away with the like facilitie that ſhe reacheth them foorth, without keeping ſtedfaſtneſſe in ought whatſoeuer: but the worſt part they found in her, was that ſhe fauoureth the wicked, and perſecuteth the vertuous; loueth the foolish, and abhorreth the wiſe; abaſeth the noble, & aduanceth the baſe: what is foule pleaſeth her, and what is faire worketh her annoiance. Many men placing confidence in their properties, becauſe they know their owne good fortune, take hardineſſe to vndertake rond and headlong enterpriſes, which yet proſper with them very luckily, and yet other men very wiſe and aduiſed, dare not aduenture to execute thoſe enterpriſes, which they haue begun with great diſcretion, finding by experience that ſuch find worſt ſucceſſe. How great a friend Fortune ſheweth her ſelfe to bad people, *Ariſtotle* maketh knowne by this probleme, Whence groweth it, that riches (for the moſt part) are poſſeſſed rather by the wicked than by men of worth? Whereto he ſhapeth anſwer, Perhaps becauſe Fortune being blind cannot know nor make choice of what is beſt. But this is an anſwer vnworthy of ſo great a philoſopher: for it is not Fortune that beſtoweth wealth on men, and though it were, yet he yeeldeth no reaſon, why ſhe alwaies cheriſheth the bad, and abandoneth the good. The true ſolution of this demand is, that the lewd ſort are very witty, and haue a gallant imagination, to beguile in buying and ſelling, and can profit in bargaining, and employing their ſtocke where occaſion of gaine is offered. But honeſt men want this imagination: many of whom had endeuoured to imitate theſe bad fellowes, and by trafficquing & trucking, within few daies haue loſt their principall.

This, Chriſt our redeemer pointed at, conſidering

the ſufficiencie of that ſteward, whom his maiſter called to accompt, who reſerving a good portion of the goods to his owne behooſe, ſalued vp all his reckonings, and got his *quietus eſt*. Which wiſdome (though it were ſaulde) yet God commended, ſaying, The children of this world are more wiſe in their kinde, than the children of light: for theſe ordinarily enioy a good vnderſtanding, with which power they place their affection on their law, and haue want of imagination, whereto the knowledge how to liue in this world appertaineth; whereto although many are morally good, becauſe they lacke the wit how to be naught. This maner of anſwering is more plaine and apparent. The naturall philoſophers, becauſe they could not reach ſo farre, deuiſed to find and ſo ſolnced a cauſe, as lady Fortune, to whoſe power they might impute good and bad ſucceſſes, & not to their vnskilfulneſſe and little knowledge of them.

Foure ſorts of people there are in euerie commons wealth, if a man liſt to marke them. For ſome men are wiſe, and ſeeme not ſo; others ſeeme ſo, and are not; others, neither are, nor ſeem, and ſome both are, and ſeem ſo. Some men there are ſilent, ſlow in ſpeech, ſtuid in anſwering, not curious nor copious of words: yet they retain hidden within them, a naturall power appertaining to the imagination, whereby they know the ſeaſon and occaſion to bring their purpoſe to paſſe, and how they are therevnto to demeane themſelues without communicating or imparting their minde to any other. Theſe by the vulgar are called happy and luckie, them ſeeming that with little knowledge, and leſſe wit, euery thing falleth into their lap.

Others, contrariwiſe are of much eloquence in words & diſcourſe, great commenters, men that take vpon them

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to gouerne the whole world, who go about hunting thorow with small expense they may reape great gains, and herein (after the vulgars conceit) no man in iudgement can step an acte beyond them, and yet, comming to the effect, all fall flat to the ground betweene their hands. Then fie on my poore fortune, and call her blind buzzard, and blade, for the matters which they dissegne & worke with much wisdome, she suffereth not to take good effect: but if there were a Fortune who might plead her owne defence, she would tell them, Your selues are my buzzards, the fools, and the doo noughts, whome you speake of, that being vnskilful, hold your selues wise, and vsing vaine meanes, would yet reape good successes. This sort of people haue a kind of imagination which decketh vp and setteth forth their words and reasons and maketh them seeme to be what in deed they are not. Wheron I conclude, that the Generall who is endowed with a wit requisit for the art militarie, and doth duly perceiue what he is to exploit, shall be fortunate and happie, otherwise it is but labour to looke that he euer prosper be victorie, vnles God do fight for him, as he did for the Israelits of Israell, and yet withall, they chose the wisest and skilfullest amongst them to be commanders, for we must not leaue all vpon Gods hands, neither yet may a man wholy affie on his own wit and sufficiencie, but it will do best to ioine both together, for there is no other Fortune, saue God and a mans own good industrie.

He who first deuised Chesse play, made a model of the art militarie, representing therein all the occurrents and cõtemplations of war, without leauing any one behind: and as in this game Fortune beareth no stroke, neither can the player who beareth the aduerse party be termed

neither fortunate, nor he who is beaten vnfortunate. So the Captain that ouercommeth ought to be called wise, and the vanquished, ignorant, and not the one happie, or the other vnhappie. The first thing which he ordained in this play was, that when the king is mated, the contrary partie is vanquished, thereby to let vs vnderstand, that the cheefe forte of an armie, consisteth in a good commaunder to gouern and direct the same: and for proofe hereof, he lotted as many cheefe men to the one side as to the other, to the end that whosoeuer lost, might be certained, it fell out through default of his owne knowledge, and not of fortune. And this is more apparantly seene, if we consider, that a skilfull player will spare halfe his men to the other partie, and yet for all that get the game. And this was it which *Vegetius* noted, that often times few soldiers and weake, vanquish many & valiant, if they be gouerned by a generall who can skill in ambushes and stratagems. He ordained also that the pawnes might not turne backe, thereby to aduise the commaunder that he only to cast all chances, ere he send fourth his soldiers to the seruice, because if any mischance ensue, it behooues rather that they be cut in peeces where they were placed, than to turne their backs, for the soldiers part is not to know, when time serueth to flie or to fight, but by direction of his captaine, and therefore so long as his life lasteth, he is to keepe his place, vnder paine of becomming infamous. Here vnto he adioined another law, that the pawne which had made fourth draughts without being taken, should be made a queene, & might make any draught at pleasure, and be played next the king, as one set at liberte, and bended with nobility; whereby he gaue vs to vnderstand, how in the warre it importeth greatly for making the soldior valiant, to

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proclaime aduantages, freecauſes, and preferments for ſuch as ſhall haue done any ſpecial peece of ſeruice. And principally, that the honour and profit paſſe to their poſteritie: for then they will exploit with greater courage, and gallantneſſe. For which cauſe *Ariſtotle* affirmeth that a man maketh more reake to be chiefe of his linage, than of his owne proper life. This *Saul* well perceiued when he cauſed to be proclaimed in the army, Whoſoeuer ſhall ſtrike that man (meaning kill the Giant *Goliat*) ſhall be made rich by the king, and ſhall haue his daughter to wife, and his houſe ſhalbe enfranchiſed in Iſrael from all manner tribute. Conformable vnto this proclamation there was a court in Spain, which ordained, that whatſoeuer ſouldier, by his good vſage, deſerued to receiue for his pay 500 Soldi, (this was the greateſt ſtipend allowed in the warres) ſhould himſelfe and his poſſeſſion, be diſcharged for euer from all taxes and ſeruices. The Moores (as they are great plaiers at cheſſe) haue in their plaies ſet ſeuen degrees in imitation of the 7 draughts, which the pawn muſt make to be a queene, and ſo they enlarge the play from one to the ſecond, and from the ſecond to the third, vntill they arriue to ſeuen, and were able to the proofe that the ſouldier ſhall giue of himſelfe; & if ſhe be ſo gallant as to enlarge his pay to the ſeuenth, they yeeld him the ſame: and for this cauſe they are termed Septemniers, or Seuenſeers. They haue large liberties and exemptions, as in Spain, thoſe gentlemen who are called *Hidalgos*. The reaſon hereof, in naturall philoſophy is verie plain: for there is no faculty of all thoſe that gouern man, which will willingly worke, vnleſſe there be ſome intereſt to moue the ſame; which *Ariſtotle* proueth in the generatiue power, and the ſelfe reaſon ſhaieth in the rationall. The obiect of the wrath-

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full facultie (as we haue aboue ſpecified) is honour and aduantage: and if this ceaſe, ſtraightwaies courage and ſtomacke decay: by all this may be conceiued the great ſignification which it carrieth to make that pawne a queene, who hath made ſeuen draughts without taking: for whatſoeuer the greateſt nobilitie in the world, that hath been or ſhalbe, hath ſprung and ſhall ſpring from pawns, and priuat men, who by the valour of their perſon haue done ſuch exploits, as they deſerued for themſelues and their poſteritie, the title of gentlemen, knights, noblemen, earls, marqueſſes, dukes and kings. True it is, that ſome are ſo ignorant and void of conſideration as they will not grant, that their nobilitie had a beginning; but that the ſame is euerlaſting, and grown into their blood; not by the grace of ſome particular king, but by the ſupernaturall and diuine reaſon. To the bent of this purpoſe (though we ſhall thereby ſomwhat lengthen our matter) I cannot but recount a verie wittie diſcourſe, which paſſed between our Lord the Prince *Don Carlos*, and the doctor *Suares* of Toledo, who was iudge of the Court in Alcala of Heuares. Prince: Doctor what thinke you of this people? Doctor. Verie well (my Lord) for here is the beſt aire, and the beſt ſoile of any place in Spain. *P.* For ſuch the phiſitions made choice of to recouer my health: haue you ſeen the Vniuerſitie? *D.* No my *L.* *P.* See it then: for it is very ſpeciall; and where they tell me the Sciences are verie learnedly red. *D.* Verily, for a colledge and particular ſtudie, it carrieth great fame, and ſhould be ſuch in effect, as your highneſſe ſpeaketh of. *P.* Where did you ſtudie? *D.* In Salamanca, my lord. *P.* And did you proceed doctor in Salamanca? *D.* My lord, no. *P.* That me ſeemeth was euill done to ſtudie in one Vniuerſitie, and

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take degree in another. *D.* May it pleaſe your highneſſe, that the charges of taking degrees in Salamanca, are exceſſiue; and therefore we poore men flie the ſame, and get vs to ſome other Vniuerſitie, knowing that we receiue our ſufficiencie and learning, not from the degree, but from our ſtudie and pains, albeit my parents were not ſo poore, but if them liſted might haue borne the charge of my proceeding in Salamanca: but your highneſſe well knoweth, that the doctors of this Vniuerſitie haue the like franchiſes, as the gentleman of Spain, and to vs who are ſuch by nature, this exemption doth hatm, at leaſt to our poſteritie. *P.* Which of the kings mine anceſtors gaue this nobility to your linage? *D.* None. And to this end your highneſſe muſt vnderſtand, there are two ſorts of gentlemen in Spain; ſome of bloud, & ſome by priuiledge. Thoſe in bloud (as my ſelfe) haue not receiued their nobility at the kings hand, but thoſe by priuiledge haue. *P.* This matter is very hard for me to conceiue, and I would gladly that you expreſſed it in plainer termes: for if my bloud roiall, reckoning from my ſelfe to my father; and from him to my grandfather; and ſo by order from ech to other commeth to finiſh in *Pelagius:* to whom by the death of the king *Don Rodericke*, the kingdome was giuen, before which time he was not king, if we reckon vp after this ſort your pedigree, ſhall we not come at laſt to end in one who was no gentleman? *D.* This diſcourſe cannot be denied, for all things haue had a beginning. *P.* I aske you then, from whence that firſt man had his nobilitie, who gaue beginning to your nobilitie? he could not enfranchiſe himſelfe, nor plucke out his own necke from the yoke of tributes and ſeruices, which before time he paied to the kings my predeceſſors: for this were a kind of theft, and a prefer-

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ing himſelfe by force with the kings patrimony, and is founded not with reaſon, that gentlemen of blood ſhould haue ſo bad an originall as this: therefore it falleth out plain, that the king gaue him freedom, and yeelded him the grace of that nobilitie. Now tell me from whom he had it. *D.* Your highneſſe concludeth verie well, and it is true, that there is no true nobilitie ſaue of the kings grant: but we terme thoſe noble of blood, of whoſe originall there is no memorie, neither is it ſpecified by writing, when the ſame began, nor what king yeilded them this fauour. And this obſcureneſſe is reckoned in the common-wealth, for more honourable than diſtinctly to know the contrarie. The common-wealth alſo maketh gentlemen: for when a man groweth valorous, of great vertue, and rich: it dareth not to challenge ſuch a one, as ſeeming thereby to doe him wrong, and that it is fit a man of that worth do liue in all franchize. This reputation paſſing to the children, & to the nephews, groweth to nobilitie, & ſo they get a pretence againſt the king. Theſe are not therefore gentlemen, becauſe they receiue 500 Soldi of pay, but when the contrarie cannot be prooued, they paſſe for ſuch. That Spaniard, who deuiſed this name of a gentleman, *Hijſidalgos*, gaue verie well to vnderſtand this doctrine which we haue ſet downe: for by his opinion, men haue two kinds of birth: the one naturall, in which all are equall, the other ſpirituall. When a man performeth any heroicall enterpriſe, or any vertue or extraordinarie worke, then is he new borne, and procureth for himſelfe other new parents, and loſeth that being which he had tofore. Yeſterday he was called the ſon of *Peter*, and nephew of *Sanchius*, and now he is named the ſonne of his owne actions. Hence had that Caſtilian prouerb

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his original which ſaith, Euery man is the ſon of his owne works. And becauſe the good and vertuous works, are in the holy ſcripture termed ſomwhat, & in the Spaniſh tongue it ſignifieth *algo*, and vices & ſins nothing, which in the Spaniſh is termed *nada*. This Spaniard compounded this word *hijo dalgo* therof, which importeth nought els, but that ſuch a one is deſcended of him, who performed ſome notorious and vertuous action: for which he deſerued to be rewarded by the king or commonwealth, togither with all his poſteritie for euer. The law of the *Partita* ſaith, that *hiio dalgo*, ſignifieth the ſonne of goods: But if we vnderſtand the ſame of temporall goods, the reaſon was not good; for there are infinit gentlemen poore, and infinit rich men, who are no gentlemen: but if he meane the ſonne of goods, that is to ſay of good qualities, it carrieth the ſame ſenſe which we before expreſſed.

Of the ſecond birth which men ought to haue beſides their naturall, there is affoorded vs a naturall example in the ſcripture, where Chriſt our redeemer reprehendeth *Nicodemus*, becauſe he (being a doctor of the law) wiſt not yet, it was neceſſarie that a man ſhould be borne of new, therby to obtain a better being, and more honourable parents than his naturall: for which cauſe, all the time that a man performeth no heroicall enterpriſe, in this ſenſe he is called *hiio de nada*, to weet the ſonne of nothing; although by his anceſtors he beare the name of *hiio dalgo*, that is the ſonne of ſomwhat, or a gentleman. To the purpoſe of this doctrine, I will recite vnto you a diſcourſe which paſſed between a very honourable Captain, and a Caualiero, who ſtood much on the pantophles of his gentilitie. Whereby ſhall be diſcouered in what the honor of this ſecond birth conſiſteth.

ſtreth. This captaine then falling in companie with a knot of Caualieros, and diſcourſing of the largeſſe & liberty, which ſouldiers enioy in Italie, in a certaine demand, which one of them made him, he gaue him the *you*, becauſe he was natiue of that place, and the ſonne of meane parents, born in a village of ſome few houſes: but the captain (aggreeued therat) anſwered ſaying; Signore your ſignory ſhall vnderſtand, that ſouldiers who haue enioyed the liberty of Italy, cannot content themſelues to make abode in Spain, becauſe of the many laws which are here enacted againſt ſuch as ſet hand to their ſword.

The other Caualieros, hearing him vſe the terme of *Signoria*, could not forbeare laughter. The Caualiero blaſhing hereat, vſed theſe words, Your *Mercede* may weet, that in Italy, to ſay *Signoria*, importeth ſo much as in Spain to ſay *mercede*, and this Signor Capitano, being accuſtomed to the vſe and maner of that country, giueth the terme of *Signiora*, where he ſhould doe that of *mercede*. Hereto the captain anſwered, ſaying; let not your Signory hold me to be a man ſo ſimple, but that I know when I am in Italy, to apply my ſelfe to the language of Italy, and in Spain, to that of Spain: but he that in Spain talking with me, may giue me the *you*, it behoueth at leaſt that he haue a Signory in Spain; & yet ſo I can ſcarſe take it wel, the Caualiero ſomwhat affrõted made reply, ſaying, why Signor Capitano are you not natiue in ſuch a place, and ſonne to ſuch a man? And know you not again who I am, and what mine anceſtors haue been? Signore (anſwered the captain) I know right well, that your Signory is a good Caualiero, and ſuch haue been your elders: but I and my right arme (which now I acknowledge for my father) are better than you & all your

linage. This captain meant to alude to the ſecond birth, when he ſaid I and my right arme; which now I acknowledge to be my father; and that not vnduly: for with his right arme, and with his ſword he had performed ſuch actions, as the valour of his perſon was equall to the nobility of that Caualiero. For the moſt part, the laws and nature (ſaith *Plato*) are contrary: for a man ſometimes iſſueth out of natures hands, with a minde verie wiſe, excellent, noble, franke, and with a wit apt to command a whole world: yet becauſe his hap was to be borne in the houſe of *Amiclas*, a baſe peaſant; by the laws he remaineth depriued of that honour and liberty, wherin nature placed him. And contrariwiſe we ſee others, whoſe wit & faſhions were ordained to be ſlaues; and yet for that they were borne in noble houſes, they come by force of the laws to be great Lords. But one thing hath been noted many daies ago, which is worthy of conſideration, that thoſe who are born in villages and thatched houſes, procoue more ſufficient men, and of greater towardneſſe for the Sciences & arms, than ſuch as haue greate Cities for their birth-place. Yet is the vulgar ſo ſubiect to ignorance, as they gather a conſequence to the contrary, from birth in meane places: hereof the ſacred ſcripture affoordeth as an example, where it is read, that the people of Iſrael much wondering at the great works of our ſauiour Chriſt, ſaid; is it poſſible, that out of Nazareth can come ought that is good? But to return to the wit of this captain, of whō we haue diſcourſed; he ought to be endowed with much vnderſtanding, and with the diffenence of imagination, which is requiſit for the art of war. Wherethrough, in this treatiſe we deliuer much doctrine, whence we may gather wherin the valour of men conſiſteth, that they may reap

eſtimation in the common-wealth.

Six things (me ſeemeth) a man ought to haue, to the end he may be termed honourable, and which of them ſoeuer want, his being is thereby impaired; but yet all of them are not placed in one ſelfe degree, nor partake a like valew, or the ſelfe qualities.

The firſt and principall, is the valour of a mans owne perſon, as touching his wiſdome, iuſtice, mind, and courage. This maketh riches and birth right; from hence grow honourable titles; from this beginning all the nobilitie in the world fetcheth his originall. And if any be ſetled in a contrary opinion, let him go to the great houſes in Spain, and he ſhall find that they all deriue their originall from particular men, who by the valour of their perſons, attained to that, which now by their ſucceſſions is poſſeſſed.

The ſecond thing which honoureth a man, next to the valour of his perſon is ſubſtance, without which we find not, that any man carrieth eſtimation in the common-wealth.

The third is, the nobilitie and antiquitie of his anceſtors, to be well born, and of honourable blood, is a thing very precious: but yet retaineth in it ſelfe a great defect; for by it ſelfe alone, it yeeldeth a ſlender auaile, aſwell in regard of the gentleman himſelfe, as of others who ſtand in need therof: for a man can neither eat nor drinke the ſame, nor apparrell himſelfe therewithall, nor giue nor beſtow the ſame: but it maketh a man to liue as dying, by depriuing him of the remedies, which he might otherwiſe procure to ſupplie his neceſſities; but let him vaine the ſame with riches, and by no degree of honour it can be counteruailed. Some are wont to reſemble nobilitie, to a cipher in numbring, which of it ſelfe

ſelfe beareth no value, but vnited with another number, multiplieth the ſame.

The fourth point which maketh a man to be of accompt, is to haue ſome dignitie or honourable office; and contrariwiſe nothing ſo much abaſeth a man, as to get his liuing by ſome handy craft.

The fift thing which honoureth a man, is to be called by a good ſurname, and a gratious chriſtian name, which may deliuer a pleaſing conſonance to the eare, & not to be termed paſty, or peſtell, as ſome that I know. We read in the generall hiſtorie of Spaine, that there came two Embaſſadours out of France, vnto king *Alfonſe* the ninth, to demand one of his daughters in marriage for their ſoueraigne king *Philip*: one of which ladies was very faire, and named *Vrraca*; the other nothing ſo gratious, and called *Blanche*. They both comming in preſence of the Embaſſadours, all men held it as a matter reſolued, that the choice would light vpon *Vrraca*, as the elder, and fairer, and better adorned: but the Embaſſadours, enquiring ech of their names, tooke offence at the name of *Vrraca*, and made choice of the lady *Blanche*: ſaying, that her name would be better receiued in France than the other.

The ſixt thing which honoureth a man, is the ſeemly ornament of his perſon, & his going well apparelled, and attended with manie waiters. The good diſcent of the Spaniſh nobilitie, is of ſuch as through the valour of their perſon, and through their honourable enterpriſes atchieued, grew in the wars to the pay of 500 Soldi. The originall whereof our late writers cannot verifie: for if they find not their matter laid down in writing, and expreſſed to their hands by others, they are vnable to ſupplie the ſame, with any inuention of their own. The difference

ference which *Ariſtotle* placeth betwixt memory and remembrance is, that if the memorie haue loſt anie of thoſe things which at firſt it knew, it cānot call the ſame to mind, without new learning thereof: but remembrance enioieth this ſpecial grace, that if it forget ought, by ſtopping a while to diſcourſe thereupon, it turneth to find out that which was before loſt. Which may be the Court that ſpeaketh in fauour of good ſouldiours, we find at this day recorded neither in books, nor in the memorie of men, but there are left as reliques theſe words, *hijo dalgo*, in thoſe that receiue 500 Soldi of pay, after the Court of Spain, and their known wages. By making diſcourſe, and arguing wheron, it will fall out an eaſie matter to find out their aſſociats. *Antony* of Lebriſſa giuing the ſignification of this verbe, *vindico, cas*: ſaith the ſame ſignifieth, to draw vnto it that which is due for pay, or by reaſon, as we ſay now a daies by a new phraſe of ſpeech, to take pay from the king. And it is a thing ſo vſed in Caſtilia the old, to ſay ſuch a one hath well impaied his trauaile, when he is well paied, that amongſt the quiller ſort, there is no maner of ſpeech more ordinarie.

From this ſignification, the word *vindicare* fetched his originall, namely, when anie one would ſtirre at the wrong offered him by another: for iniury metaphorically is termed debt. After this ſort when we now ſay, ſuch a one is *hijo dalgo, de vengar quinientos ſueldos*, that is, a gentleman of the pay of 500 Soldi, we meane that he is deſcended from a ſouldier ſo valiant, as for his proweſſe he deſerued to receiue ſo large a pay, as is that of 500 Soldi. VVho by the court of Spain was (with all his poſteritie) enfranchiſed from paying any tallages or ſeruities to the king. This known pay as nought elſe ſaue the

entrance which ſuch a ſouldiour made into the number of thoſe, whoſe ſtipend was 500 Soldi: for then were regiſtred in the kings booke, the name of the ſouldiour, the countrey where he was born, and who were his parents, and progenitors: for the more certaintie to him who receiued this benefit and ſtipend. Euen as at this day we read in the book of *Bezerro*, which is kept at Salamanca, where are foūd written, the beginning of well neere all the Spaniſh nobilitie. The ſemblable diligence vſed *Saul*, when *Dauid* ſlew *Goliat*: for forthwith he ſent *Abner* his captain, to take information of what ſtock the yong man was deſcended. Antiently they termed *Solaro*, the houſe of the villaine, aſwell as of the gentleman.

But ſithens we haue ſtepped aſide into this digreſſion, it behoooueth to make returne to our purpoſe from whence we parted, and to know whence it groweth, that in play at cheſſe, which we tearmed a counterfeit of war, a man ſhameth more to looſe, than at any other game, albeit the ſame turne him to no damnage, neither is the play for monie: and whence it may ſpring that the lookers on ſee more draughts than the plaiers themſelues, though they are leſſe ſeene in the play? and that which moſt importeth is, that ſome gamſters play beſt faſting, and ſome better after meat. The firſt doubt holdeth like difficultie, for we haue auouched, that in warre and in cheſſe-play fortune hath nought to do, neither may we be allowed to ſay, Who would euer haue thought this? but all is ignorance and careleſneſſe in him that leeſeth, and wiſedome and cunning in him that getteth. And when a man is ouercome in matters of wit & ſufficiencie, and is cut off from all allegations of excuſe or pretence, other than his own ignorance, it followeth

followeth a matter of neceſſitie that he wax aſhamed: for man is reaſonable, and a friend to his reputation, and cannot brooke that in the works of this power, any other ſhould ſtep a foot before him. For which cauſe *Ariſtotle* demaundeth what the reaſon may be, why the antients conſented not that ſpeciall rewards ſhould be aſſigned to thoſe, who ſurpaſſed the reſt in the Sciences, & yet ordained ſome for the beſt leaper, runner, thrower of the barre, and wreſtler? To which he frameth anſwer, That in wreſtling and bodily contentions, it is tollerated that there be Iudges aſſigned, who ſhall cenſure how far one man exceedeth another, to the end they may iuſtly yeeld prize to the vanquiſher, it falling out a matter of no difficultie for the eye to diſcerne who leapeth moſt ground, or runneth with greateſt ſwiftneſſe: but in matters of ſcience it prooueth very hard to trie by the vnderſtanding, which exceedeth other, for that it is a thing appertaining to the ſpirit, and of much queintneſſe; and if the iudge liſt to giue the prize maliciouſly, all men cannot looke thereunto, for it is a iudgement much eſtranged from the ſenſe of the beholders. Beſides this anſwer, *Ariſtotle* giueth another which is better, ſaying, That men make no great recke to be ouercome in throwing, wraſtling, running, and leaping, for that they are graces wherein the verie brute beaſts outpaſſe vs. But that which we cannot endure with patience, is, to haue another adiudged more wiſe and aduiſed than our ſelues, wherethrough they grow in hatred with the iudges, and ſeeke to be reuenged of them, thinking that of malice they went about to ſhame thē. Therfore to ſhun theſe incōueniences, they would not yeeld conſent, that in works appertaining to the reaſonable part, men ſhould be allowed either iudges or rewards.

Whence is gathered, that the Vniuerſities do ill who aſſigne iudges and rewards of the firſt, ſecond, and third degree, in licencing thoſe that prooue beſt at the examinations.

For beſides that the inconueniences alleaged by *Ariſtotle* do betide, it is repugnant to the doctrine of the goſpell, that men grow into contention who ſhould be cheefe. And that this is true, we ſee manifeſtly, for that the diſciples of our ſauiour Chriſt, comming one day from a certain voiage, treated amongſt themſelues, who ſhould be the greateſt, and being now ariued at their lodging, their maiſter asked them whereof they had reaſoned vpon the way: but they (though ſomwhat blunt) well vnderſtood how this queſtion was not allowable, wherthrough the text ſaith, that they durſt not tell him, but becauſe from God nothing can be concealed, he ſpake vnto them in this manner, If any will be chiefe amongſt you, he ſhalbe the laſt of all, and ſeruant to the reſt. The Phariſies were abhorred by Chriſt our redeemer, becauſe they loued the higheſt ſeats at feaſts, and the principall chaires in the Sinagogues. The chiefe reaſon wheron they rely, who beſtow degrees after this maner, is, that when ſchollers know ech of them ſhalbe rewarded according to the triall which they ſhall giue of themſelues, they will skantly affoord themſelues time frō their ſtudie, to ſleep or eat. Which would ceaſe, were there not a reward for him that taketh pains, or chaſtiſment for him that addicteth himſelfe to looſeneſſe and loitering. But this is a ſlender reaſon, and ſo only in apparence, and preſuppoſeth a great falſhood, which is, that knowledge may be gotten by continuall plodding at the booke, and by hearing of good maiſters, and neuer leeſing a leſſon. And they marke not, that if a ſchol-

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ler want the wit and abilitie requiſit for the learning which he applieth, it falleth out a loſt labour, to beat his head day and night at his books. And the error is ſuch, that if differences of wits, ſo far diſtant as theſe, do enter into competencie, the one through his quicke capacity, without ſtudying or poaring in books, getteth learning in a trice, and the other, for that he is block-headed and dull, after he hath toiled all his life long, can ſmall skill in the matter.

Now the Iudges come, as men to giue the firſt price to him, who was enabled by nature, and tooke no trauell, and the laſt to him who was born void of capacitie, yet neuer gaue ouer ſtudying; as if the one had gotten learning by turning ouer his books, and the other loſt the ſame through his owne ſluggiſhneſſe. And it fareth as if they ordained prices for two horſes, of which the one had his legs ſound and nimble, and the other halted down right. If the Vniuerſities did admit to the ſtudie of the Sciences, none but ſuch as had a wit capable ther-of, and were all equall, it ſhould ſeeme a thing well done to ordaine reward and puniſhment: for whoſoeuer knew moſt, it would therby appeare that he pained himſelfe moſt, and who knew leaſt, had giuen himſelfe more to his eaſe.

To the ſecond doubt we anſwer, that as the eies ſtand in need of light, and cleereneſſe, to ſee figures and colours, ſo the imagination hath need of light in the brain, to ſee the fantaſies which are in the memory. This cleerneſſe, the ſunne giueth not, nor any lamp or candle, but the vital ſpirits which are bred in the heart, and diſperſed throughout the body. Herewithall it is requiſit to know that feare gathereth all the vitall ſpirits to the heart, and leaueth the braine darcke, and all the other parts of the

body

body cold. Whervpon *Ariſtotle* maketh this demaund, Whence commeth it, that who ſo feareth, his voice, his hands, and his nether lip do tremble? whereto he anſwereth, that through this feare, the naturall heat hieth to the heart, and leaueth all the reſidue of the body a-cold, and the cold (as is before touched) by *Galens* mind, hindereth all the powers and faculties of the ſoule, and ſuffereth not them to worke.

Hence beginneth the anſwer of this ſecond doubt, and it is, that thoſe who play at Cheſſe, conceiue feare to looſe, becauſe the game ſtandeth vpon termes of reputation and diſgrace, and for that Fortune hath no ſtroke therein, ſo the vitall ſpirits aſſembling to the heart, the imagination is foreſlowed by the cold, and the fantaſms in the darke, for which two reaſons, he who plaieth cannot bring his purpoſe to effect. But the lookers on, in as much as this no way importeth them, neither ſtand in fear of looſing through want of skill, do behold more draughts, for that their imagination retaineth his heat, and his figures are enlightened by the light of the vitall ſpirits. True it is, that much light reaueth alſo the light of the imagination, and it befalleth what time the player waxeth aſhamed and out of countenaunce to ſee his aduerſarie beat him; then through this aggreeuednes, the naturall heat encreaſeth, and enlighteneth more than is requiſit, of all which he that ſtandeth by is deuoid. From hence iſſueth an effect very vſual in the world, that what time a man endeuoreth to make the beſt muſter of himſelfe, and his learning and ſufficiencie moſt knowne, it prooueth worſt with him: with others againe the contrarie betideth, who being brought to their triall, make a great ſhow, and paſſed out of the liſts, appeare of little woorth, and of all this, the reaſon is very manifeſt, for he

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whoſe head is filled with much naturall heat, if you appoint him to do an exerciſe of learning or diſputation, within foure and twentie hours after, a part of that exceſſiue heat which he hath, flieth to the heart, and ſo the brain remaineth temperat, and in this diſpoſition (as we wil prooue in the chapter enſuing) many points woorth the vtterance, preſent themſelues to a mans remembrance. But he who is very wiſe and endowed with a great vnderſtanding, being brought to triall, by means of feare, cannot retaine the naturall heat in his head, whereon through default of light, he findeth not in his memorie what to deliuer.

If this fell into their conſideration, who take vpon them to controll the Generals of armies, blaming their actions, and the order which they ſet down in the field, they ſhould diſcerne how great a difference reſteth betweene the giuing a looking on the fight out at a window, or the breaking of a launce therein, and the feare to leeſe an armie whoſe charge their ſoueraigne hath committed to their hands.

No leſſe dammage doth feare procure the Phyſition in curing, for his practiſe (as we haue prooued heretofore) appertaineth to the imagination, which reſteth more annoied by cold than any other power, for that his operation conſiſteth in heat. Whence we ſee by experience, that Phyſitions can ſooner cure the vulgar ſort, than Princes and great perſonages. A counſellor at law one day asked me (knowing that I handled this matter) what the cauſe might be, that in the affairs where he was well payd, many caſes and points of learning came to his memorie, but with ſuch as yeelded not to his trauell what was due, it ſeemed that all his knowledge was ſhrunke out of his braine: whome I anſwered, that mat-

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ters of intereſt appertained to the wrathfull faculty, which maketh his reſidence in the heart, and if the ſame receiue not contentment, it doth not willingly ſend forth the vitall ſpirits, by whoſe light, the figures which reſt in the memory may be diſcerned. But when that findeth ſatisfaction, it cheerfully affoordeth naturall heat. Wherthrough the reaſonable ſoule obtaineth ſufficient cleerneſſe to ſee whatſoeuer is written in the head. This defect do men of great vnderſtanding partake, who are pinching, and relie much on their intereſt, and in ſuch is the propertie of that counſellor beſt diſcerned. But who ſo falleth into due conſideration hereof, ſhall obſerue it to be an action of Iuſtice, that he who laboureth in another mans vineyard be well paied his wages.

The like reaſon is currant for the phiſition, to whom (when they are wel hired) many remedies preſent themſelues: otherwiſe, the art (aſwell in them as the lawyer) ſlippeth out of their fingers. But here a matter very important is to be noted, namely; that the good imagination of the phiſition, diſcouereth on a ſodain what is neceſſarie to be done. And if he take leiſure and farther conſideration, a thouſand inconueniences come into his fancie, which hold him in ſuſpenſe, and this-while the occaſion of the remedie paſſeth away. Therfore it is neuer good, to aduiſe the phiſition to conſider well what he hath in hand, but that he forthwith execute what firſt he purpoſed. For we haue prooued heretofore, that much ſpeculation maketh the naturall heat to auoid out of the head, and again the ſame may encreaſe ſo far forth, as to turmoile the imagination. But the phiſition in whom it is ſlacke, ſhall not doe amiſſe to vſe long contemplation: for the heat aduancing it ſelfe vp

to

to the braine, ſhall come to attaine that point, which to this power is behooffull.

The third doubt in the matters alreadie rehearſed, hath his anſwer very manifeſt: for the difference of the imagination, with which we play at cheſſe, requireth a certaine point of heat, to ſee the draughts, and he that plaieth well faſting, hath then the degree of heat requiſit thereunto. But through the heat of the meat, the ſame exceedeth that point which was neceſſarie, and ſo he plaieth worſe. The contrarie befalleth to ſuch as play wel after meales, for the heat riſing vp togither with the meat and the wine, arriueth to the point, which wanted whiles he was faſting. It is therefore needfull to amend a place in *Plato*, who ſaith, that nature hath with great wiſdome diſioyned the liuer from the braine, to the end the meat with his vapours, ſhould not trouble the contemplation of the reaſonable ſoule. But here if he mean thoſe operations which appertain to the vnderſtanding, he ſpeaketh very well, but it can take no place in anie of the differences of the imagination. Which is ſeen by experience in feaſts and banquets: for when the gueſts are come to mid meale, they begin to tell pleaſant tales, merriments, and ſimilitudes; where at the beginning none had a word to ſay; but at the end of the feaſt, their tongue faileth them, for the heat is paſſed beyond the bound, requiſit for the imagination. Such as need to eat and drinke a little, to the end the imagination may lift vp it ſelfe, are melancholicke by adaſtion: for ſuch haue their brain like hot lime, which taken vp into your hand, is cold and drie in feeling: but if you bath the ſame in anie liquor, you cannot endure the heat which groweth therof.

We muſt alſo correct that law of the Carthagineans, which

which *Plato* alleageth; whereby they forbad their Captains to drinke wine, when they went to their wars, and likewise their gouernours, during the yeare of their office. And albeit *Plato* held the same for a verie iust law, and neuer maketh an end of commending the same; yet it behoueth to make a distinction: we haue alleaged heretofore, that the worke of iudging appertaineth to discourse, and that this power abhorreth heat, and therefore receiueth much damnage by wine: but to gouern a common-wealth, (which is a distinct matter from taking into your hand a processe, & giuing sentence thervpon) belongeth to the imagination, and that requireth heat. And the gouernor not arriuing to the point, which is requisit, may well drinke a little wine, so to attaine the same. The like may be said touching the generall of an army, whose councell partaketh also with the imagination. And if the naturall heat be by any hot thing to be aduanced, none performeth it so well as wine; but it is requisit, that the same be temperately taken, for there is no nourishment which so giueth and reareth a mans wit, as this liquor. Wherefore it behoueth the Generall to know the maner of his imagination, whether the same be of those which need meat and drinke to supply the heat that wanteth, or to abide fasting: for in this onely consisteth how to mannage his affaires well or euill.

CHAP. XIIII.

How we may know to what difference of abilitie the office of a king appertaineth, and what signes he ought to haue, who enioyeth this maner of wit.

When

WHen *Salomon* was chosen king and head of so great and numberfull a people, as that of Israell; the text saith, that for gouerning and ruling them, he craued wisdom from heauen, and nothing besides. Which demand so much pleased God, as in reward of hauing asked so well, he made him the wiseſt king of the world, and not so contented, he gaue him great riches and glorie, euermore holding his requeſt in better price. Whence is manifeſtly gathered, that the greateſt wisdome and knowledge which may possibly be in the world, is that foundation, vpon which the office of a king relieth. Which conclusion is so certaine and true, as it were but loſt labour to spend time in the proofe thereof. Only it behooueth to shew to what difference of wit the art of being a king, and such a one as is requiſit for the common wealth, appertaineth: and to vntold the tokens, whereby the man may be known who is indoweed with this wit and abilitie. Wherethrough it is certaine, that as the office of a king exceedeth all the arts in the world; so the same requireth a perfection of wit in the largeſt measure that nature can deuiſe. What the same is we haue not as yet defined: for we haue been occupied in distributing to the other arts, their differences & maners. But since we now haue the same in handling, it muſt be vnderſtood that of nine temperatures, which are in mankind, one onely (saith *Galen*) maketh a man ſo surpaſſing wiſe, as by nature he can be. Wherein the first qualities are in ſuch weighe and measure, that the heat exceedeth not the cold, nor the moiſt the drie; but are found in ſuch equalitie and euenheire, as if really they were not contraries, nor had any naturall oppoſition. Whence reſulteth an inſtrument

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ſtrument ſo appliable to the operations of the reaſonable ſoul, that man commeth to poſſeſſe a perfect memory of things paſſed, and a great imagination to ſee what is to come, and a great vnderſtanding, to diſtinguiſh, inferre, argue, iudge, and make choice. The other differences of wit (by vs recounted) haue not anie one amongſt them of ſound perfection: for if a man poſſeſſe great vnderſtanding, he cannot (by means of much drineſſe) compriſe the ſciences which appertain to the imagination and the memorie; and if he be of great imagination, by reaſon of much heat, he remaineth vnſufficient for the ſciences of the vnderſtanding and the memorie, and if he enioy a great memorie, we haue tofore expreſſed how vnable thoſe of much memory (through their exceſſiue moiſture) do proue for all the other ſciences. Only this difference of wit, which we now are a ſearching is that, which anſwereth all the arts in proportion. How much dammage the vnableneſſe of adioyning the reſt, breedeth to any one knowledge, *Plato* noteth, ſaying; That the perfection of ech in particular, dependeth on the notice and knowledge of them all in generall.

No ſort of knowledge is found ſo diſtinctly and ſeuered from another, but that the skill in the one much aideth to the others perfection. But how ſhall we do, if hauing ſought for this difference of wit with great diligence in all Spaine, I can find but one ſuch? Whereby I conceiue, that *Galen* ſaid verie well, That out of Greece, nature not ſo much as in a dream, maketh any man temperat, or with a wit requiſit for the ſciences. And the ſame *Galen* alleageth the reaſon hereof, ſaying; That Greece is the moſt temperat region of the world. Where the heate of the aire exceedeth not the cold, nor the

moiſt

moiſt the dry. Which temperature, maketh men very wiſe and able for all the Sciences, as appeareth, conſidering the great number of famous mē, who thence haue iſſued, as *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Hippocrates*, *Galen*, *Theophraſtus*, *Demoſthenes*, *Homer*, *Thales Mileſius*, *Diogenes Cynicus*, *Solon*, and infinit other wiſe men mentioned in hiſtories, whoſe works we find repleniſhed with all ſciences. Not as the writers of other prouinces, who if they treat of phiſicke, or any other ſcience, it prooues a miracle, for them to alleage any other ſort of ſcience in their aid or fauour. All of them are beggerly and without furniture, as wanting a wit capable of all the arts. But which we may moſt maruell at in Greece is, that whereas the wit of women is found ſo repugnant vnto learning (as hereafter we will prooue) yet there haue ben ſo many ſhe Greeks, ſo ſpecially ſeen in the ſciences, as they haue grown into competencie with the ſufficienteſt men: as namely *Leontia*, a moſt wiſe woman, who wrote againſt *Theophraſtus*, the greateſt Philoſopher of his time, reproouing him for many errors in philoſophy. But if we looke into other Prouinces of the world, hardly ſhall we find ſprung vp any one wit that was notable. Which groweth for that they inhabit places diſtempered, where men become brutiſh, ſlow of capacitie, and ill conditioned.

For this cauſe *Ariſtotle* moueth a doubt, ſaying; What meaneth it, that thoſe who inhabit a country, either ouer cold, or ouer hot, are fierce and fell in countenance and conditions, To which probleme he anſwereth verie well, ſaying; that a good temperature, not only maketh a good grace in the body, but alſo aideth the wit and ability. And as the exceſſes of heat and cold do hinder nature, that ſhe cannot ſhape a man in good figure;

So (alſo for the like reaſon) the harmonie of the ſoule is turned topſie turnie, and the wit prooueth ſlow and dull.

This the Greeks well wiſt, inaſmuch as they termed al the nations of the world Barbarians, conſidering their ſlender ſufficiencie and littſe knowledge. Whence we ſee, that of ſo many that are borne and ſtudie out of Greece, if they be Philoſophers, none of them arriueth to the perfection of *Plato*, and *Ariſtotle*: if Phiſitions, to *Hippocrates* and *Galen*: if orators, to *Demoſthenes*: if Poets, to *Homer*: and ſo in the reſidue of the ſciences parts, the Greeks haue euer held the formoſt ranke beyond al contradiction. At leaſt the probleme of *Ariſtotle* is very wel verified in the Greeks: for verily they are the men of moſt ſufficiencie and loftieſt capacity in the world: were it not that they liue in diſgrace, oppreſſed by force of armes in bondage, and all hardly intreated, by the comming of the Turks, who baniſhed all learning, and cauſed the Vniuerſitie of Athens, to paſſe vnto Paris in France, where at this day the ſame cõtinueth. And (thus through want of manurance) ſo many gallant wits (as we haue before reported) are vtterly periſhed. In the other regions out of Greece, though ſchools and exerciſe of learning are planted, yet no man hath proued in them of any rare excellency.

The Phiſition holded he hath waded very far, if with his wit he can attain to that which *Hippocrates* and *Galen* deliuered, and the naturall Philoſopher reckoneth himſelfe ſo full of knowledge, as he can be capable of no more, if he once grow to the vnderſtanding of *Ariſtotle*. But this notwithſtanding, it goeth not for an vniuerſall rule, that all ſuch as haue Greece for their birth-place, muſt of force be temperate and wiſe, and all the reſidue

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diſtemperat and ignorant: for the ſame *Galen* recounteth of *Anacharſis*, who was born in Scythia, that he carried the reputation of a rare wit amongſt the Grecians, though himſelfe a Barbarian. A Philoſopher, borne in Athens, falling in contention with him, ſaid vnto him; get thee hence thou Barbarian. Then *Anacharſis* anſwered, My countrey is to me a ſhame, and ſo art thou to thine: for Scythia, being a region ſo diſtemperat, and where ſo many ignorant perſons liue, my ſelf am grown to knowledge, and thou being borne in Athens, a place of wit and wiſdome, wert neuer other than an Aſſe. In ſort, that we need not vtterly deſpaire in regard of the temperature: neither thinke it a caſe of impoſſibilitie, to meet herewithall out of Greece, and eſpecially in Spain, a region not verie diſtemperat: for as I haue found one of theſe differences in Spaine, ſo it may well be, that there are many others not yet come to knowledge, and which I haue not been able to find out. It ſhall doe well therefore, to intreat of the tokens, by which a temperat man may be diſcerned, to the end where ſuch a one is, he may not be hidden.

Many ſignes haue the Phiſitions laid down to diſcouer this difference of wit, but the moſt principall, and which affoord beſt notice, are theſe following.

The firſt (ſaith *Galen*) is to haue his haire abourne, a colour betweene white and red; and that paſſing from age to age, they euer become more golden. And the reaſon is very cleere: for the materiall cauſe whereof the haire conſiſteth, the Phiſitions ſay, is a groſſe vapour, which ariſeth from the digeſtion, that the brain maketh at the time of his nouriſhment; and looke what colour is of the member, ſuch alſo is that of his excrements. If the braine in his compoſition partake much of fleagme,

the haire in growth is white, if much choler, ſaffron coloured: but if theſe two humours reſt equally mingled, the braine becommeth temperat, hot, cold, moiſt, and dry; and the haire abourn, partaking both the extremes. True it is *Hippocrates* ſaith, that this colour in men, who liue vnder the North, as are the Engliſh, Flemmiſh, and Almains, ſpringeth for that their whitneſſe is parched vp with much cold, and not for the reaſon by vs alleaged. Wherfore in this token it behooueth to be wel aduiſed: otherwiſe we may ſoon ſlip into error.

The ſecond token which a man, who ſhalbe endowed with this difference of wit, muſt haue, is, ſaith *Galen*, to be well ſhaped, of good countenance, of ſeemly grace, and cheerfull: in ſort, that the ſight may take delight to behold him, as a figure of rare perfection. And the reaſon is very plain: for if nature haue much force, and a ſeed well ſeaſoned, ſhe alwaies formeth of things poſſible, the beſt and moſt perfect in his kind: but being purueied of forces, moſtly ſhe placeth her ſtudie in faſhioning the braine, for that amongſt all other parts of the bodie, the ſame is the principal ſeat of the reaſonable ſoul: whence we ſee many men to be great and foule, and yet of an excellent wit.

The quantity of body, which a temperat man ought to haue (ſaith *Galen*) is not reſolutely determined by nature, for he may be long, ſhort, and of mean ſtature, conformable to the quantitie of the temperat ſeed, which it had when it was ſhaped. But as touching that which appertaineth to the wit in temperat perſons, a mean ſtature is better than either a great or little. And if we muſt lean to either of the extreames, it is better to encline to the little than to the great: for the bones and ſuperfluous fleſh (as we haue prooued heeretofore, by the opinion

of

of *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*) bring great dammage to the wit. Agreeable hereunto, the naturall Philoſophers are wont to demand, whence it proceedeth, that men of ſmall ſtature, are ordinarily more wiſe, than thoſe of long ſtature. And for proofe hereof, they cite *Homer*, who ſaith that *Vliſſes* was very wiſe, and little of bodie, and contrariwiſe *Aiax* very fooliſh, and in ſtature tall. To this queſtion they make verie ſimple anſwer, ſaying, that the reaſonable ſoule gathered into a narrow roome, hath thereby more force to worke conformable to that old ſaw, Vertue is of more force vnited than diſperſed: and contrariwiſe making abode in a body long and large, it wanteth ſufficient vertue to moue and animat the ſame. But this is not the reaſon thereof: for we ſhould rather ſay, that long men haue much moiſture in their compoſition, which extendeth out their fleſh, and adeth the ſame to that increaſe which the naturall heat doth euer procure. The contrary betideth in little bodies: for through their much drineſſe, the fleſh cannot take his courſe, nor the naturall heat enlarge or ſtretch it out, and therefore they remaine of ſhort ſtature. And we haue earſt proued that amongſt the firſt qualities, none bringeth ſo great dammage to the operations of the reaſonable ſoule, as much moiſture, and that none ſo farre quencheth the vnderſtanding, as drineſſe.

The third ſigne (ſaith *Galen*) by which a temperat man may be knowen, is, that he be vertuous and of good conditions: for if he be lewd and vitious, *Plato* affirmeth it groweth for that in man there is ſome diſtemperat qualitie, which vrgeth him to offend: and if ſuch a one will practiſe that which is agreeable to vertue, it behoueth, that firſt he renounce his owne naturall inclination. But whoſoeuer is abſolutely temperat, ſtandeth not inclined

of any such diligence, for the inferiour powers require nothing at his hands, that is contrary to reason. Therefore *Galen* saith, that to a man who is possessed of this temperature, we need prescribe no diet what he shall eat and drinke: for he neuer exceedeth the quantitie and measure which phisicke would assigne him. And *Galen* contenteth not himselfe to terme them most temperat; but moreouer auoucheth, that it is not necessary to moderat their other passions of the soule: for his anger, his sadnesse, his pleasure, and his mirth, are alwaies measured by reason. Whence it followeth, that they are euermore healthfull and neuer diseased, and this is the fourth figure.

But herein *Galen* swarueth from reason: for it is impossible to frame a man, that shalbe perfect in all his powers, as the body is temperat, and that his wrathfull and concupiscentiall power, get not the soueraignitie ouer reason, and incite him to sin. For it is not fitting to suffer any man (how temperat soeuer) to follow alwaies his owne naturall inclination without gainsetting and correcting him by reason. This is easily vnderstood, considering the temperature which the braine ought to haue, to the end the same may be made a conuenient instrument for the reasonable facultie: and that which the heart should hold, to the end the wrathfull power may couet glorie, empire, victorie, and soueraignitie ouer all: and that which the liuer ought to haue for digesting the meats, and that which ought to reste in the cods, to be able to preserue mankind, and to increase the same. Of the brain, we haue said sundry times tofore, that it should retaine moisture, for memory; drinesse, for discourse; and heat, for the imagination. But for all this, his naturall temperature is cold and moist; and by reason of the

more or leſſe of theſe two qualities, ſometimes we ſeeme it hot, and ſometimes cold; now moiſt, then drie: but the cold and moiſt grow to predominate. The liuer, wherein the facultie of concupiſcence reſideth, hath for his naturall temperature, heat and moiſture to predominate; and from this it neuer altereth, ſo long as a man liueth. And if ſometimes we ſay it is cold, it groweth, for that the ſame hath not all the degrees of heat requiſite to his owne operations. As touching the heart, which is the inſtrument of the wrathfull facultie, *Galen* affirmeth of his owne nature to be ſo hot, as if (while a creature liueth) we put our finger into his hollowneſſe, it will grow impoſſible to hold the ſame there one moment without burning. And albeit ſometimes we terme it cold; yet we may not conceiue, that the ſame doth predominate: for this is a caſe impoſſible, but that the ſame conſiſteth not in ſuch degree of heat, as to his operations is behoofefull.

In the cods, where the other part of the concupiſcible maketh abode: the like reaſon taketh place; for the predomination of his naturall temperature, is hot and drie. And if ſometimes we ſay, that a mans cods are cold; we muſt not abſolutly ſo vnderſtand the ſame: neither to predomination, but that the degree of heat, requiſite for the generatiue vertue is wanting. Hereon we plainly inferre, that if a man be well compounded and inſtrumentalized, it behoueth of force, that he haue exceſſiue heat in his heart: for otherwiſe the wrathfull facultie would grow verie remiſſe, and if the liuer be not exceeding hot, it cannot diſgeſt the meat, nor make blood for nouriſhment: and if the cods haue not more heat than cold, a man will proue impotent, and without power of begetting. Wherefore theſe two members

(being of such force as we haue said) it followeth of ne-
ceſſitie, that the braine take alteration through much
heat, which is one of the qualities that moſt paineth rea-
ſon, and which is worſt, the will being free, inciteth and
inclineth it ſelfe to condiſcend to the appetites of the
lower portion.

By this reckoning it appeareth, that nature cannot fa-
shion ſuch a man as may be perfect in al his powers, nor
produce him enclined to vertue. How repugnant it is
vnto the nature of man, that he become inclined to ver-
tue, is eaſily proued, conſidering the compoſition of
the firſt man, which though the moſt perfect that euer
mankinde enioyed, ſauing that of Chriſt our redeemer,
and ſhaped by the hands of ſo great an artificer: yet if
God had not infuſed into him a ſupernaturall qualitie,
which might keepe downe his inferiour part, it was im-
poſſible (abiding in the principles of his owne nature)
that he ſhould not be enclined to euill. And that God
made Adam of a perfect power to wrath and concupi-
ſcence, is well to be vnderſtood, in that he ſaid and com-
manded him, Encreaſe and multiply, and to repleniſh
the earth. And is certaine, that he gaue them an able
power for procreation, & made them not of a cold com-
plexion, inaſmuch as he commanded him that he ſhould
people the earth with men, which worke cannot be ac-
compliſhed without abundance of heat. And no leſſe
heat did he beſtow vpon the faculties nutritiue: with
which he was to reſtore his conſumed ſubſtance, and re-
new another in lieu thereof. Seeing that he ſaid to the
man and the woman, Behold, I haue giuen you euerie
herb, that bringeth forth ſeed vpon the earth, & what-
ſoeuer trees haue ſeed of their kind, to the end they may
ſerue you for food: for if God had giuen them a fa-
macke

macke and liuer, cold and of little heat, for certain they could not haue digeſted their meat, nor preſerue themſelues 900 yeares aliue in the world. He fortified alſo the heart, and gaue the ſame a wrathfull faculty, which might yeeld him apt to be a king and lord, and to command the whole world, and ſaid vnto them, Do you ſubdue the earth, and command ouer the fiſhes of the ſea, and the foules of the aire, and all the beaſts that mooue on the face of the earth. But if he had not giuen them much heat, they had not partaken ſo much viuacitie, nor authoritie of ſouereigntie, of commandement, of glory, of maieſtie, and of honour.

How much it endamageth a prince, to haue his wrathfull powers remiſſe, cannot ſufficiently be expreſſed; for through this only cauſe it befalleth, that he is not feared not obeied, nor reuerenced by his ſubiects. After hauing fortified the wrathfull and concupiſcible powers, giuing vnto the foreſaid members ſo much heat, he paſſed to the faculty reaſonable, and ſhaped for the ſame a braine cold and moiſt, in ſuch degree, and ofa ſubſtance ſo delicat, that the ſoule might with the ſame diſcourſe, and philoſophize, and vſe his infuſed knowledge. For we haue already auouched, and therecolorq prooued, that God to beſtow a ſupernaturall knowledge vpon men, Firſt ordereth their wit, and maketh them capable, by way of the naturall diſpoſitions deliuered by his hand, that they may receiue the ſame: for which cauſe, the text of the holy ſcripture affirmeth, that he gaue them a heart to conceiue, and repleniſhed them with the diſcipline of vnderſtanding. The wrathful and concupiſcentiall powers, being then ſo mighty through great heat, and the reaſonable ſo weake and remiſſe to reſiſt, God made proviſion of a ſupernaturall qualitie,